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PREFACE 
China's militant approach to the economic and political fields 
has dra\m the attention of the Western and the Chinese Scholars, and 
much has been written about it in the past few years. In the present 
study , I have endeavored to analyse the salient features of Chinese 
approach to economic development. I have dwelt upon at length 
the peculiar method used by the Communist countries - of cutting 
down the consumption and raising investment. In the absence of official 
statistics since 1959 , the study of the Chinese economic development 
has been reduced to "educated guesses," where I have relied heavily 
on the Western Scholars for the information used. 
To Dr. Leonard J. Arrington, Professor of Economics, the 
author expresses his appreciation and gratitude for his invaluable 
assistance and continuous guidance in preparation of this thesis. 
The writer is also indebted to Professors V. L. Isrealson, B. C. 
Jensen, E. B. Mnrray and R. P . Collier for their precious guidance 
and encouragement. To Mrs. Alide Hannwm and Dr . Thomas Hannwm, 
I am thankful for reading the manuscript and making valuable suggestions. 
Many thanks to my mother , whose inspiration and encouragement 
has enabled me to go fo~ higheJ" studies in the United States. 
Appreciation is also due to Mrs. Charell Harris , who has patiently 
typed this manuscri pt. 
Mandhatasinh A. Chauhan 
CHAPTER I 
AGRICULTURE JN THE CHINESE ECONOMY 
Introducti on 
Chinese agriculture differs from the Western agriculture in 
the deve lopment and utilization of agricultural science on the fields . 
China has always been an agricultural country, but she failed to im-
prove tn techniques of cultivation as the time passed by . The land, 
prior to the Communist take -over, was owned and cultivated by in-
dividuals and the produce was sold in a free-market. Unfortunately, 
the Chinese governme nt, prior to 1949, failed to bring about adequate 
agricultura l r e forms and implement economic development measures. 
As a result an overwi1e lming propor tion of tpe,popi.tlation of China 
is occupied on the land , the supply of which is fixed, and the capital 
r e sources e mployed are s mall , the per capita output and income of 
China a re low . With the vas t majority of the population in agriculture 
and low per capita output , the national income of the country is also 
low. Thus , China is classified as an underdeveloped nation. Arising 
from the same problem of overpopulation , the family land was sub-
d ivided and fragmented into economi callv ine fficient units before the 
Communist take-over. 
With its low per capita income, China's capital formation is 
slow and difficult . Investment in substantial quantities is al most im-
possible , unless the country imports foreign assistance or cuts down its 
own consumption be low even the present low level and forcibly creates 
an exportable surplus. For an agricultural nation to transform itself 
into an industrial one , creation of an agricultural surplus is desirable, 
not only to finance imports of industrial goods, but also to feed the 
growing urban non-agricultural population. An agricultural surplus 
also will satisfy the demand resulting from the rise in per capita in-
come. An agricultural surplus is a prerequisite toward establishing 
social overhead capital , expanding manufacturing, providing educational 
facilities and other services, and raising the rural per capita income . 
This, relatively a general statement, is applicable to a country 
that has a comparative advantage in agriculture. 
The Chinese Communists, after 1949, sought to riase the per 
capita income and productivity of their resources by "raising the ir own 
bootstraps. " If the efficient farmers had been allowed to expand their 
activities, they could have raised the productivity. But the Communist 
regime, in accordance with Socialist dogma, chose to organize farms 
2 
mto cu- o""rad.<Oii. Therein lay tt.t I 
izJ.tion . 
"problem of China's indus trial-
Cultivable Lands 
Of China's to ta l area of 9 . 5 million square milometers, l. 09 
million is far m land , 967,000 is forest , 2. 67 million is pasture , and 
l. 13 m;d u)H r eclaimable waste land . About 6 percent of the cultivated 
land (600 , 000 squar e ki lom eters) mainly in the north·, is alkali soil. 1 
Thus , the present cultivable area could be doubled within a short per-
iod with little e fforts. 
China is said to have today 1 , 600 million mow (9, 714 million 
acres) of arab le land , or 0. 4 1175 acres per head , as compared to 
0 . 32 94 acres in Britain, 0. 57645 acr es in Holland, 0. 6588 in India , 
1. 81 17 acres in t he United States a nd France, and 2 . 4705 in So11iet 
R ussia. 2 
It has been reported that only about 80 million he ctares (or , 
197. 680 million acres) are suitable for tractors . The "machine 
1Harold Mun te-Ka.1.s, "China's F 1e lds and Factories ," Far 
Easte rn Economic R eview, LI (February 3, 1966) , 153. 
3 
2P . H. M. Jones, "One Million Tractors," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, XLVI (September 3 , 1964) . 431. 
Converted into a cres; one mo w = 0. 1647 acres , or 0 . 0666 hectare. 
n.buut t:. . 5 ll1V\" iu China fJ Ll .. t..." ... 1 ~~ c-:>mpared to 2 mow in 
Britain, 3. 5 in Holla nd , 4 in Ind ia , 11 in the United States and 
France. and 15 in !ioviet Ru ssia. 
cult1vated area would probably not exceed onc-eightb or under one-tenth 
of the total cultivated land . Since land s ui table for tractors is located 
in a~eas of low y1elds . the margmal increase in the production, owing 
to cul ivati on by tractors would be minimal. ,.I Even if there is an in-
creas of 15 to 20 percent in th 10 percent of the land planted to grain, 
the increast' in rhe output would amount to l. 5 to 2 percent. 
Agricultural Institutions 
Communists dogmatically b .lieve in uprooting the older 
institutions and imposing centrally-controlled orgamzations . Thus, 
as soon as the hinese Communists came into power , they began a 
reorganiMtJOn of agriculture . This policy also elicited the support 
of peasants for the regime . In Russia , collectivization was adopted 
by a "one step at a time" m ethod and mechanization took place simul-
taneously . Aware of her industrial backwardness , China decided to 
collectivi ze hurr1edly. 2 
1Yuan-Li Wu , ''Industrial Developme nt in China ," Current 
History , XXXXV (September , 1963) , 175 . Convered on the basis 
of one hectare = 2. 471 acres . 
2
s. B. Thomas . 'Commumst China' s AgTarian Policy , 1954-
1956 , '' Pacific Affairs. XXTX (Jun , 1956) , 145 . 
4 
The ultimate goal was to organize the small individual farms 
into large collective farms. The temporary mutual aid groups , per-
manent mutual aid groups, and agricultural producers ' co-operatives 
were finally to lead to the formation of collective farms. Under the 
mutual aid teams, members pooled some of their draft animals and 
implements, co-ordinated some of their individual production plans, 
and accumulated common property. 1 
All the land was pooled in an agricultural co -operative. Each 
member retained the ownership and the share (according to the size 
of his land) . on which he drew dividends. 2 He was allowed to keep a 
plot of land for his personal use . 
By September, 1954 , a total of 500 , 000 co-operative farms, 
and by 195 7, half of the country's land and more than half of the 
peasant households , were to be organized into co-operatives. 3 
1Yuan-Li Wu , An Economic Survey of Communist China 
(New York: Bookman Associates, 1956), p. 143. 
2T. J. Hughes and D. E. T. Luarcl , The Economic Develop-
ment of Communist China, 1949-1958 (New York: Oxford University 
} ' ( L <·, 1959) , p . 143. 
3Yuan-Li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China, 
p . lH. 
5 
6 
The co-operatives were envisaged as a means of enabling large-
scale mechanized farming and development of new techniques and in-
novations. They were also designed to e nable planning of agriculture, 
industry, comsumption and investment , exports, and so on. Cooperatives 
were thought to comply with the Communist philosophy of the ownership 
of the means of production held by the state and the elimination of 
private property. The system permitted direct control by the party cadre, 
as the heads of the co-operatives, over the peasants. 
At the end of 1954 Peking realized that agricultural production 
had not increased much from the 1952 level, while the population had 
inc reased consistently by a 2 percent annual average over the 1948-
1953 period. Thus , Mao called for an immediate collectivization and 
production drive in mid-1955. 1 
On March 25, 1955, the Agricultural Bank of China was established 
under the over-all direction of the state-owned Chinese People's Bank. 2 
Its main purpose was to extend short and long term credits to farmers . 
1Edwin F. Jones, "The Impact of the Food Crisis on Peiping's 
P olicies, " Asian Survey , II (December, 1962), 3-4. 
2s. h . Thomas , " ommun' ·• , J" na ' Agrarian Policy , 1954-
1956 1 II p. 158. 
The co-operatives were not large enough to exercise effective 
control over commercial credits and industrial establishments, which 
had to be controlled by the central government directly. Even shortage 
of managerial skills was felt acute ly , for co-operatives could not obtain 
enough personnel to establish large-scale industries. 1 The same was 
true in obtaining industrial finances locally. Thus, the co-operatives, 
comprising around 200 families, were reorganized into communes of 
4 , 000 to 5, 000 families in August, 1958. Private plots were abolished 
and so were the free markets in which the peasants could sell their 
produce. 
Paradoxically, Communist China faced a disastrous period of 
natural calamities between 1959 and 1962, which made its leaders re-
vise their policies. They had to reintroduce the free-market, and pri-
vate plots were restored . 2 At the same time, the time required to work 
on the communes was fixed to enable farmers to work on their private 
1Dwight H. Perkins, "Centralization and Decentralization in 
Mainland China's Agriculture, 1949-1962," The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics , LXXVID (May, 1964) , p. 229. 
2Audu oy Donuelll.orn, "The urg"a ·c.tion of Rural Trade in China 
Since 1 58," The China ~uarterly, VID (October-December, 1961), 
rv n n. 
7 
8 
pl0!R. 1 The communes we r e organized into production brigade s , which 
were furthe r divided int • production teams . The brigade decided upon 
th agricultu ral pr odu ctio n , while the tea m allocated the l abor and 
specialized on different far~ ac tivities . 2 Thus, after seve ral years 
of tri a l and error with the large units of holdings, the Peking regime 
came back to a unit smaller than that with which it had started. 
Agriculture and Price Policy 
In 1950 agricultura l production was pe rhaps two-thirds of the pre-
war leve l , and the amount that was marke te d had declined to 21 percent 
of the total output , which wa s at 53 percent level of the total , in the pre-
war period . 3 This decline was the result of the thirteen years of war 
followed by the Civil War , which had disrupte d the rural marke ts. 
P rcd c tion of the industrial raw materials had declined sharply. 
Output of cotton had fa llen to 47 percent of tho 1933 production in 1949, 
1Felix Green, Awakened China (Ne w York: Doubleday, 1961) , 
p 4 ' 
2 .T,~ n ltohinson , " The Chi n•''"' C'o mmune s , " The Political 
uar te r l , XXXV (July-Septe mber, 1964) , pp. 2~8-89. 
while that of tea and cocoa fe ll to 16 pe rcent and 4 percent of the 1933 
level. 1 
The Peking regime made an e ffective use of price~incentives 
in increasing the output. The official price was raised to the pre-war 
level, which was again raised in 1951, and paid in advance for the pro-
mise of planting cotton in a certain number of acres. This resulted in 
a reduction of grain acreage by 11 percent and diverting more land to 
cotton and oilseed crops by 1959. 2 
This raised the production of cotton beyond expectations and 
the acreage under it above the 1933 leve l. So in 1953 the cotton 
advance purchases were abolished. The price of cotton was lowered 
compared to grains so as to encourage the pvoduction of grans. But 
this had an adverse effect, so advance purchases were reintroduced 
to the 1952 level in 1954. 3 
1T. C. Liu and K. C. Yeh , The E conomy of the Chinese Main-
land: National Income and Economic Development, 1933-1959, (2 vols; 
Santa Monica: Rand Research Memorandum, 1963), p. 455 . 
2Reed J. Irvine, "Phantom Food in Communist China," Asian 
;:)u ... ve >, ~ . ~ Nia .::t..t, ..i.~ J .i J , 1-' · 23 . 
3Perkins, op. cit. , p . 213 . 
9 
10 
The parity ratio was employed in determining the rate at which 
cotton farmers should pay the agricultural tax computed in terms of 
grain and exchanging cotton for grain through the government-sponsored 
marketing agencies. The price of tea was raised from 4. 9 to 5. 7 times 
the price of middle grade rice in 1951, and to 7. 86 times in 1953. 1 Tea 
production increased gradually. 
The state faced difficulties in making substantial grain purchases 
during the 1950-1953 period, in spite of the substantial increase in grain 
output. This was because the llicome elasticity of food in underdeveloped 
countries is higher, around 0. 6 or higher, versus 0. 2 or 0. 3 in the 
developed countries . 2 Thus, with a slight rise in per capita income, 
the demand for food grains has a much greater imact. TI1is generally 
could be suppressed by a high agricultural taxation policy or quota 
system. Approximately 90 percent of China's taxes were collected in 
agricultural products. Nevertheless, it was likely to lead to an in-
flation in agricultural prices . 
1Ibid. , p. 214. 
2Bruce F. Johnston and John W. Mel'lor, ''Role of Agriculture 
in Economic Development," American Economic Review, lJ (September, 
1961), pp. 57'--572 . 
11 
For this reason , the Communist regime introduced the quota 
system in 1954-1955. This , of course, affected the farmer's incentives 
to produce more , so agricultural production fell. 
Under the quota system, the state purchased excessively, re-
gardless of what consumption needs were. This sparked off a discon-
tent among the farmers. Thus, in 1956 quotas were reduced. This 
caused the government to feel the need for introducing centralized 
organization to implement the wishes of the state in the field of agri-
cultural production. Aware of the effect of the centralization on the 
Soviet agriculture, the Chinese carefully left a gap to provide sufficient 
incentives to the farmers . 
During this period , although private plots were allotted to in-
dividuals , the free market was abolished and the prices of these sub-
sidiary products were fixed arbitrarily low by the state and to co-
operative stores. The output on private plots, which amounted to 30 
percent of all Chinese farm products, fell sharply in 1956. 1 In 1957 
the regime increased the size of the private plots and reduced cadre 
interference into the farm er's activities on the plot . 
1 1~. L. Chao , Ecunonu~ P ..w u ..... -b _ ! . ~ Orga.cization in Main-
land China , (2 vols., Cambridge, Ma ssachuttes: Centre for East Asian 
StudJ <: S, Harvard Unive rsn;y . 1959\, TI . ·1:1 - 17. 
In 1956 and 1957 officials again tried to raise the production of 
crops through raising purchase prices. The prices of grapeseeds 
were raised from 50 percent to 70 percent in 1956; that of oil seeds 
from 10 percent to 30 percent. The price of tea, which was already 7 
percent up from the 1955 leve l , was further raised by 7 percent. 
Control over the rate of savings was achieved by merely setting 
limitations on the proportion of income that dould be saved. 
This centralization acted as a repulsive force on agricultural 
yields, which increased at a very slow rate between 1956 and 1957. 1 
Industrial growth in 195 7 was th(ts slowed down,, 0\ving to the 
Jack of co-ordination and planning in different sectors of the economy. 
Absence of sufficient incentives, the overemphasis given to industrial 
priority, and the cash crops in agriculture were causes. Thus, by 
1958 the economy was at its low ebb, even worse than what it was in 
1955 . 
12 
In order to expand the unit of agricultural production, the communes 
were organized in 1958. The cadre influence on subsidiary production, 
on the rate of savings and consumption, and on the planting and harvesting 
1Ten Great Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), 
p . lJ '1, 
13 
of the major crops was enormous under the mass propaganda of the 
"Great Leap Forward. nl Private plots and free markets were abolished 
altogether. The establishment of communes ended all house ownership 
and nationalized all shops. 2 
According to the official series of the gross value of agricultural 
output, Peking claimed to have an annual rate of increase of 4. 5 percent 
during the First Five Year Plan . This claim is dubious. In 1958 and 
early 1959 grain production was declared to be 375 million metric tons, 
as compared with 185 million tons in 1957. 3 This doubling of grain out-
put within a year is clearly impossible and serves to reveal the faulty 
statistical system that China was using. 
The decentralization of authority to the communes level in 1958-
1959 led to undue competition among the communes which resulted 
1Peking, op. cit. , p. 228. 
2R. H. S. Crossman, "Chinese Notebook," Encounter, (March, 
1959) , p. 19; and "Transition to Communism (II)," China News Analysis, 
No. 279 (June 5, 1959) , l-7. 
q 3Yuan-Li Wu, The Economy of Communist China: An Intoduction, 
(N w York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishing Company, 1965) , p. 136. 
14 
in tiJ.e falsification of statistics. 1 This further disrupted planned goals 
and co-ordination with other sectors of the economy. 2 
At che s ame t:me huge credits and budget allocations were made 
to the com , unes by the state for the first time under the "Great Leap" 
feve r. ~ Tni~ ied them to ignore income, profit , and efficiency goals; 
they concentrated on fulfilling the targets only . 
Under the communes, the food which was earlier grown on pri -
vate plots served as free supply, under the "part-wage part-free supply" 
system of distribution. 4 
Ag:tin in 1959 the official productivity claim abruptly declined 
to 250 mil lion tons; that is, one-third smaller than the original 
esti mate, which is a lso undoubtedly an over-statement . 5 The unavail-
ability of accurate statistics and the decentralized control made it 
difficult for the regime to react immediately to the crisis presented by 
the bad weathe r in 1959 and 1961. 
, 
-choh Ming- Li. The Statistical System of Communist China 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1962) , p. 71. 
2A. Donnethorn, "Background to ·.the People's Communes: Changes 
in China ' s Economic Organization in 1958," Pacific Affairs , XXXII 
(December, 1959), 353. 
3
··col:.dnc uis, - Ch~11a .1 e \-~ _'..;:.. 1,-_:~ No. 258 ("'T3nuary 2. 1958) , 5 . 
4Donnet"-orn , cp. ci': . , p. 349; ard 'f'nrkins, op. c it. , p. 231. 
vThe "'!all S_t:ree_t_o!ou!'!'~ , August 27, 1959 ; and Irvine, op. cit., p. 23. 
15 
In 959 the regime reintroduced private plots and free markets. 1 
A family of six could have one-tenth or even one-fifth of an acre as its 
private plot; in any case, the area set aside for them in a commune should 
not exceed 5 or 7 percent of the total. 2 
Agricultural Prociluction 
It is difficult to obtain accurate data regarding agricultural 
production according to crops. Whatever data are available are highly 
conflicting and at times misleading. The figures presented here are 
estimates. 
On observing Table 1, one can see a sharp decline in total grain 
acreage and production in 1959. The mistake in shifting acreage to 
cotton and oil seed production was corrected in 1960, but total grain pro-
ductlon did not improve fast enough because of mismanageme nt and bad 
weather. 
On the whole , agricultural production has barely kept pace with 
the p · at"!D incre aos, except for the bad weather years of 1959-1962 
when China faced a severe agricultural crisis. 
1DonP.elhQr'1e , "'The Organi ?:· t.\0 n f Rura l Trade in China Since 
1958." The China Quarterly, No . 8 (vetobt.1-De e mbe r, 1<iol j , 77- 91; 
Qnct "Cl anges and Mudd le." China New>< -~~~- No. 299 (October 30, 
9(>9) !. 
Tab' e I '' 1 '-lP ;>. >duc tion in mainland China - 1955-1963 
- ---
-- - ·-· 
Total gr ain Rice Wheat Potatoes _ _ Misce llaneou '!___ 
P r octuC:O;:;-
Area (m. m< tric Produ- Produ- P1·odu- P r odu-
Yea· (m . hect3re s ) tons _, Area tion Area tion Area --:.on Ar e a tion 
- - - - -- - - --
195 118. " 174 . 8 29 . 2 78 . 0 26 . 7 23. 0 10.1 18.9 52. 4 55. 0 
195 ' 12-L 3 182 . 5 33.2 82 . 5 27.3 24.8 11. 0 21.9 52.7 53. 4 
195 120 . 9 185 . 0 32 .2 86 .8 27 . 5 23.7 10. 5 21. 9 50.6 52.7 
195<1 12 l. 3 250.0 32.7 113.7 26.6 29.0 16.3 45.4 45.7 62. 0 
193 . 5* 90. 0* 24. 0* 29.3* 50.2* 
1959 1>·:J . J 270. 1 29.7 80 .2* 24.3 24.3* 12. 7 21. 6* 42.9 4 1. 6* 
167.6* 
1960 1 ·o.o 159.6 31.5 77.5 27.8 22.2 13. 5 21.6 47.2 38. 2 
1961 1 L9 . 6 166.6 31.5 80.0 24 . 6 16.5 14 . 0 24 . 6 49.4 45.4 
1962 ES. 8 178.2 29.3 80.6 24.4 20.0 13.1 23.6 52 . 0 54. 1 
1963 118.5 179.1 28.2 78.4 24.2 21.8 13.3 24.3 53.0 54. 6 
--- ----
*The fi gures f•l r 1958 and 1959 with the asterisk are the official ones , while the ones without the asterisk are the 
estimates . All of the figures for 1960-1963 inclusive are estimates. 
..... 
Source : D. J. Dwyer, "China's Recent Harvests," The GeograQhical Journal, CXXX (June, 1964) , 322. Reproduced "' 
from Current Scene , 1964. Some of the figures are estimates . 
Professor Yuan-Li Wu feels that Communist Chinese statistics 
issued before 1958 are underestimates of the grain output and the ones 
released after 1958 have an upward bias. He thinks that China did not 
have large stocks in 1950 for there was m rationing system introduced 
then, while the official figures sho\\ed that she had withdrawn around 
200 million tons, in cumulative totals, from the stocks between 1950-
1956. Thus, he feels, there is 25 percent underestimate of gross 
output. Again, until 1956 the acreage under cultivation showed a 
statistical increase, for there is no accurate reporting system. After 
1956 when collectivization had begun the acreage reporting gained 
accuracy. The State Statistical Bt1reau was not established until 1952. 
While the cumulative stocks between 1957 and 1961 show some 165 
million tons, which sounds inconsistent, Professor Yuan-Li Wu dis-
counts the official figures by 38 percent for 1958 and 28 percent for 
1!!60 in Table 2. 1 
Between 1953 and 1957 , according to one estimate, the pro-
portion of gross domestic product aris ing from agriculture fe ll 
from 45 percent to 38 percent. In 1960 it fell further to 26 percent, 
perhaps because of the overestimate of industrial production and the 
Yuan- Li Wu , oo. Cit .. pp. i -l..l-· H 4 
17 
Table 2. Balance sheet of Chi ~ ·s c rops 
1950 108. 1 180 
1951 124. 7 183 
1952 135.1 184 
1953 154.4 180 
1954 156.9 177 
1955 160. 5 184 
1956 174.8 182 
1957 182 .5 185 
1958 185.0 175 
i~59 ~50 . 0 154 
130 
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245 
245 
245 
245 
245 
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24" 
202 
150 
" 
" 0'0 ] § 
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& ·s 
547 
558 
569 
581 
595 
608 
621 
637 
654 
66~ 
682 
133 . 9 
136.6 
139 . 3 +0. 9 
142. 4 +0. 9 
145. 7 +1. 1 
148.9 +1. 3 
152.1 +1.2 
141. 8 +1. 1 
160. 2 +1. 2 
140.4 +1.7 
jl' •. ! 
b.O 
" '<1 
·~ (/} 
'"-"' s " ., 0 
o;;t; 
143.8 +7 . 2 
145.4 +6.1 
146. 5 +4. 1 
142. 9 -2.8 
140.4 -8.5 
146.1 -6.0 
144. 9 +3. J. 
146.8 -13.4 
138.6 -1.8 
123.5 +15. 4 
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Table 2. Continued 
196 1 185. 0g 140 14G 693 101. 1 -5 .6 109. 6 +8. 5 
1962 160 145 702 103. 5 -3 .2 115.2 +11. 7 
aSour ee: Great Ten Years (Peking, Fore ign Languages Press, 1959) , p. 
105. 
bit is assumed that there wa s an unde r estimate of grain production during 
1950-1955, and an overestimate of stocks with the government, thus, the 
author di s tr ibutes the cumulation t,o tal of grain production over individual 
years in the same proportion as the ass umed underrating of equivalent 
plan ted during the same pe riocl. Sou n ee : Yuan - Li Wu, The Economy of 
Communist China: An Introduction (Ne w York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
~ 1965), p . 140 , 146. 
~Rations fixed in 1951, were 201 kilogram a year for persons doing light 
work, and 252 for heavy work. Since between 1954-1956 urban popu-
lation wa s 14 percent of the total and rurla 86 percent. The aver age 
comes to At> kilograms per pe rson pe r armum. In 19,57 it was 210 
kilogr a ms , and so on. It was varied as shown in Official production 
figure s . Also see Yuan-Li Wu, ''Farm Crisis in Hed China," Current 
History, XLID (September, 1962), p. 162. (Ration per adult per year in 
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dkilogr ams . ) 
Population growth is based on officia l estimate through 1957, 2. 2 annual 
increase for 1958-19 59, 19!!0- 1962 is a little lo wer rate. (Mid-year popu-
l ation in millions). 
~On the bas is of pe r cap ita r ati on (estimated human consumption). 
Total production , minus net exports and the 20 percent of the total offic ially 
.ot c iarc<o as going b waste, seeds , feed and manufacturing. (Total avail-
aUH ... iol humdll \....UlJOUlUtJ ..,i0ll . ) 
g:'r,•m unadjusted offiCial figure s (In grai n terms, Official production of 
r...:.~dh nf pu t~ttoe ::; in t•rr:e€d tn~ ,\rear). 
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crisis in agriculture. During 1960-1962 industrial production fell 
sharply, the trend was reversed, and the proportion again rose to 
43 percent in 1962 . Net domestic product was higher , since it does 
not involve much depreciation- 46 percent in 1953 , 39 in 1957 , 27 in 
1960, and 47 in 1962. 1 
During 1952-1957, 77 to 78 percent of the population was en-
gaged in agricultural production. Per capita output figures show a 
decrease of l. 7 percent in agriculture during the ·period, while 
the non-agricultural sector shows a 44 percent increase. Per capita 
output in terms of gross value added in the non-agricultural sector was 
3. 7 time s that of agriculture in 1952 and 5. 5 times in 1957. 2 
During 1952 , 59 percent of China's ex-ports were agricultural 
products a nd 23 percent manufactured products of agricultural origin. 
In 191>7 the figures were 40 percent and 31.5 percent, respectively. 3 
[t is doubtful that the Chinese officials themselves have a clear 
Jdea of a~ricultural output, owing to the inaccuracy of the data. In 
ny case. me agricuituml crisis of 1959- 1962 manifested that the pro-
ductivitv had not "increased . although labor inputs had increased. 
l .b.ll.' l'· 132 . 
"Ibid. 
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Neverthe less , communal accumulation and the other share 
capital and works performed on some of theprojects amounted to some 
15 percent of income in 1957 , a nd the per capita personal income pro-
bably was arou nd 48 to 56 yuan a year, whi le in 1931-1936 the per capita 
rural income was 58 yuan at pre-war prices. 1 
Communes as such increased the labor force and the labor 
mobility. Thus it made a labor intensive agricultural operation 
possible. But the lack of incentives, commune officials' undue inter-
ference and mismanageme nt, a nd high rate of income savings ratio 
brought about an agricultural cris is which was complicated by the bad 
weather . This led to a further increase in the numbe.r of communes 
from 24,000 to 100 , 000 in 1962, a nd the number of brigades to 500,000. 
Thi.s change was brought about to enable efficie nt operation in smaller 
units. 
1Ibid. ' p. 151. 
A note on the exchange rate of yuan to a dollar wou ld not be out 
of place here. One U. S. dollar equaled 3. 839 yuan in 1933, 
"'·Lt . ,u.uh J..l • ..._ 9~7 \oi[eL.t.. '.,,the m'lrket rate in Hong 
Kong according to one report, was about 5.5 yuan in 1958, 7. 7 
)Urtll in 1959, 7. :.<. 10 1960 and 8. V ;.., l 0f>1 ancl 196?.. 
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-p; e I <is and the Technolop;y 
Much of China' s cultiva ble land is on slopes and is organized 
into te rraces, which do not allow irrigation or drainage wi thout some 
kind of meC'hanical aid. Earlier this was done through foot-pedaled 
or animal-propelled water wheels . ~n 1962-1963 China claimed to have 
irriaged a bout 50 million hectares, of which 4 . 8 million hectares were 
by e lectrical pumps in 1963 , compared to 3. 4 in 1962. 1 There are no 
figures published of diesel pumps , perhaps because of the shortage of 
oil. 
Indiscriminate irrigation during the "Great Leap" period into 
s aline and alkaline lands led to destruction of crops, owing to leakage 
2 
of water from canals into sa lty soil and spreading into the fields. 
Mechanization of agriculture is very desirable in order to raise 
the per capita productivity in the fields. But China's l and, in general , 
is not suited to a high degree of mechanization. Until 1958, she had to 
1colina MacDougall , "Power in Communes," Far Eastern 
Economic R~view_, XXXIX (Januar 31 , 1963) , 118. 
2
"Crop and Weather," Far Eastern Economic Revie w, XXXVI 
(May 10, 1962). 263 . 
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import all her tractors. From 1915 to 1949 less than 1, 000 tr actors 
were imported for use on the experimental farms. 1 
During the First Plan, 22,000 were imported. In 1960 , the 
number of China was at 81, 000 ; 90,000 in 1961 and approximately 
100~0 00 (15 h. p . units) by 1962 . 2 Many of these tractors were em-
ployed by tracto r stations ; 390 of them were set up during 1953-1957. 3 
By the end of 1960 28,000 tractors were employed by 2, 490 large state 
farms, which aver aged 2, 100 hectares each. 4 
Chemical fertilizers ar e very important inputs needed to raise 
the productivity of agriculture . Chemical fertilizer production in 1958 
was . 811 million tons , while in 1959 it was 1. 78 million, 2. 78 in 1960 
and 2 . 20 in 1962, which is supposed to have been doubled in 1965. China 
imported 1. 5 million tons in 1958 and 1. 2 in 1962 . 5 
1Henry Lethbridge, "China: Collectivization and Mechanization, " 
Far Eastern Economic Review, XXIX (February, 1963) , 309-312. 
2Ibid . , and Peking Review, VI (March I, 1963) 28. 
3Leslie, T. C. Kuo , "Agricultural Mechanization in Communist 
China," The China Quarterly, No. 17 (January-March, 1964), 134-150. 
4Yuan- Li Wu, op. cit., p. 154. 
5Harold Munte -Kaas , "Chh1:1'~ FI<>lds and Factories , " Far 
Eastern Economic Review, U (February 3, 1966), 154. 
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Recently China has e stablished a nation-wide network of Agro-
Te chnical Stations, the functions of which a r e to spread improved 
te chniques, examine traditional farming methods , train technicians, 
and so on. 1 
Appraisal 
To tap the agricultural surplus, the Marxist- Leninist model 
has advocated a direct state participation, thl'ough the development, 
organization and operation of farming . Through state farms, collective 
farms or co-operative farms and communes. The purpose is to ex-
ploit the anticipated economics of scale ar:d technology as well as direct 
supeni i sion and central planning. 
The quota system was invented to feed the rising urban population . 
The r equired quota was to be sold to the state procurement agencies be-
fore any distribution of the output, at arbitrarily fixed low prices. 
There was rationing of food and fibre in the urban-industrial 
sector through the means of s tate-controlled retail stores, and con-
sumers ' co-operatives , with r egu lated wage a nd price controls. 
1Henry Lethbridge, "Trends in Chinese Agriculture , " Far 
E'J~len Ec"no m!c Re'new, , L (May J O, l f!< i 'l l. 499-500 . 
It seems from the above discussion that the Chinese have 
merely been able to keep pace with population growth, except for the 
disastrous years of 1959-1962. On way to increase agricultural pro-
duction in China would be to invest in the reclamation of lands which 
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can be profitably cultivated. Another would be to expand the production 
of fertilizers. The area under irrigation should be expanded. Mechan-
ization has a limited application on the Chinese farms, fur the land is 
not quite suited for it. At the same time, labor is much cheaper as 
compared with machinery and fuel expenses. Peking will have to ad-
here more and more to labor intensive techniques. Peasant incentives, 
adequate supply of inputs, increasing technical guidance, and co-
ordination of different sectors are pre-conditions of agricultural develop-
ment in China. Simultaneously, the "population explosion," which is 
a drag on her economy, must be brought under control. 
As indicated in Table 2, China's per capita food consumption 
has been consistently declining. While her stocks of food grains 
have been r· ising in chd1a r d years of 1960- 1962. 'fl1is could be because 
China fears that she might get involved in a large-scale war. Since 
China ·s goals are , economic self-sufficiency and a strong national defense, 
shc; i s inclined +o hard-press the conq" !l"'rq. 
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CHAPTER II 
INDUSTRIA L UPSURGE 
Sociali zation of Private Bus iness 
China gave a high priority to the industrial development , which 
le f agr icu l •.1r e to be developed at a later stage. In order to bring 
about a high rate of industrial growth Communis t doctrine advocates 
the owners hip of the state over all the means of production , a s the first 
step towards the Utopian ideal of reaching the state of society in which 
"one contr ib(ltes according to h l ~ ability and receives according to hi s 
needs. " Russian Communists sought to bring about a radica l break 
from capitalism as s oon a s they came to powe r , but without success. 
The Chin" "" attitude toward it , on the other hand , was quite restrained, 
Dt lea~t iP the beginn ''lg. 
Tn 1949, arou'lri :•a lf of the Chinese industrial output and more 
than th r ee-fourths of the wholesale and reta il trade we re handled by 
p r ivate - enterprise. 1 
1Georg:e N. Ecklund , "Protraeted Expropriation of P r ivate Business 
. t: Cu-">.:lUni.;t China ." ~ '<!fi!i~ffairs . x-r<G ~ (FPl!. i.96. ' · 238 . 
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To tighten her control over private e nterprises , the Peking 
regime launched in 1950 - 1952 the " Wu-fan" or "five-anti" (bribery , 
tax evasions. theft of state property, cheating, and private speculation) 
and the "thre <~-anti" (corruption, waste, and bureaucratism in the Party . 
and Government) movements. 1 Under these programs, 76 percent of 
the 160 , 000 merchants were found guilty, in the seven leading 
cities in which investigations took place. 2 The private sector was asked 
to carry on business only with the Government at fixed prices. This 
gesture of liberalism probably owed its allegiance to the predominant 
depe ndence of the economy on the private sector . But it did not last 
very long , for it was a product of convenie nce. 
In 1956, all priva te enterprises were brought under direct 
state control. The owners of the firms were to be paid 5 percent interest 
on th<> 'r <::'J~ a~.l invested from 1956 to 1965 . The Government the n 
1Ronald Hsia, "' Private Enterprise in Communist China, " 
_?arHic Affair s, XXVI (Dece mber, 1953), 330. 
:; Theodor e Hsi - en Chen, "'TI1e Liquidation of P nvate Business 
h Comm 1n'st China , " ar as te rn Sur:.':~'. XXIV (June, 1955) , 
8~-Aa. 
undertook the consolidation campaign. Thousands of smaller firms all 
over China were swallowed up by large organizations. 1 
With the disaster of the "great Leap" capitalism , which 
possesses the self-generating e lements of incentive, re-emerged 
in china. with the reintroduction of private plo ts and free markets. 
Industrial Performance 
The whole of the period under consideration can be divided into 
three phases : the rehabilitation period (1950-1952), the First-Five 
Year P lan (1953-1957) and the Great Leap Forward and its aftermath . 
The r ehabilitation period undertook to restore the economy to 
nor mal after World War II , the Civil War, and the post-war inflation. 
This implementation of the socialization of private trade , industry, 
and land ended in 1956. 
Dunng the First Plan, industrial growth was phenomenal, 
Althou h official Chinese figures had exaggerated the development by 
keeplllg 1952, a de f. : e< s ed year for trade and industry , as their base 
year . The " three anti" and " five anti" movements had considerable 
ro le to play in slowing down economic activities in 1952. Thus , some 
1Ecklund, Ol' . cit. , p. 245. 
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western economists have taken 1933 as the base year, while others 
have taken 1957 as the base year to determine the rate of growth in 
China. Again, the tendency with the centralized economies is that 
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they fix the prices of "new products" unwarrantedly high, at experimental 
cost leve ls , and so the data on industrial growth shows an upward bias. 
Furthermore, the Chinese Communists do not seem to be considering 
the qualitative improvements in their products. One of the mos t con-
spicuous objections to the reliability of the Chinese industrial statistics 
is that they use the gross value of the output as the accounting unit, 
rather than the value-added approach. This appr each takes into account 
the raw materials and the inte rmediate products. Thus it tends to 
exaggerate industrial growth figures. Changes in gross value may be 
an outcome of changes in the compos ition or combination of the inputs. 
All these factors combined make it difficult to arrive at an accurate 
rate of industrial development in China. This method is preferred by 
the Chinese Communists , either to impress their subjects and the lay-
outside-observers; or it is adopted because of the lack of statistical 
sophistication on their part. 
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Quantitative Record 
Whatever statistical method is used , the unprecedented high 
r a te of industr ial growth is evident. On examining Table 3 on gross 
output of modern industry , it becomes quite clear that within the 
Firs t Plan , China doubled her output , although we do not have any 
means of inspecting the quality of good produced. 
The Chinese gave a very high priority to industrial development 
in their F'rst Plan. The proportion of investment in industry to total 
inves tment in the FFYP (1953-1957) was 45 percent , while in 1958, the 
first year of the Great Leap , it was 64 . 8 percent . 1 
Accordmg to the official Gros s Industrial Output statistics, 
the industrial ou tput as a whole had increased from 34.3 billion (1952 
yuan) to '1~.4 in 1957 and around 214.2 billion by 1960. Even within 
this , thoe. modern industry" output had increased from 22. 1 billion in 
1952 to S5 6 m 1957 . while handicraft industry (both factory and cottage) 
had increased fro m 12 . 1 billion in 1952 to 22. 8 in 1957. According to 
these figures, the "modf'r n industry" sector grew 152. 4 percent over 
th per iod (see Table 3) , and handicrafts by 85 . 4 percent. But western 
1Kang Chao , "Indices of Industria l Output in Communist China," 
]_,._l.''C r , •• ~· f EconC'rni<•:o an Statistic'!.: X L · !. ug-o.~st. 1963), 286. 
T ab:. 3. Al Lernative estimates of gross output of modern industry a 
"Composite Series" 
of es timates based Chao Kang 
Official s tatistics on functions of Annual rate 
ad jus ted for e lectricity and L iu-Yeh Chao Kan~ of fac to ry 
"new 2roduct effect" finished steel in2uts c es timatesd estimates prod. inc . 
Year Value Index Value Index Index Index (percent/ 
1952 22 . 0 100 22 . 4 100 100 100 
19"'3 28.4 129.1 27 8 124.1 122. 9 124.7 24.7 
1954 33.0 150.0 32. 7 Hl6. 0 142.2 141.6 13.5 
1955 35.6 161. 8 36 . 4 162. 5 159.0 146 . 9 3. 7 
1956 45.0 204.6 44.7 199.6 210. 8 182 . 2 24.0 
1957 49.7 225.9 50 . 0 223.2 238 .6 195.9 7.5 
1958 289.2 272 . 6 39 .2 
19 59 373.5 371.4 36.2 
ain b1llion yuans at 1952 prices . 1952 = 100). 
Sour ces: bFred C. Hung and Yuan-Li Wu, " Conceptual Difficulties in Measuring China's Industrial Output, " 
cThe China Quarterly, No. 17 (January-March , 1964) , 61. 
" Composite Series," from Yuan-Li Wu , The Economy of Communist China: An Introduction (New 
d York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) , p. 112. 
Ta Chung Liu and Kung Chia Yeh, "Preliminary Estimate of the National Income of the Chinese 
Mainland, 1952-1959," The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, LI (May , 1961), 
ei?· 490. 
Chao Kang, "Indices of Industrial Output in Communist Chila," The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, XLV (August, 1963), p. 290. 
fibid. 
scholars have tempered the rate to the moderate level seen in Table 3. 
In any case, the "modern industrial" sector has progressed at a much 
higher rate than any other sector of the economy. 
The annual rate of growth shows a highly uneven trend. The 
annual rate of growth is generally lower in the First Plan period than 
in the period of economic rehabilitation (1949-1952) and the first two 
years of the Second Five Year Plan (1958-1959). The highest rate 
of increase was witnessed in 1958 (39. 2 percent) in the factory pro-
duction in the whole period under consideration. The rate of growth 
touched its ebb in 1955 wi th an annual rate of increase in factory pro-
duction of 3. 7 percent and in 1957 or 7. 5 percent (see Table 3, column 
5 ). 
ln the " composite series" of estimates given in Table 3 Pro-
fessor Wu ha s used e lectric power and finished steel inputs. 
Over the First Plan period, the average annual rate of growth 
of UHJ modern industry has been quite variable, according to the ~ 
estimates of different western Sinologis ts . Official estimates claim it 
to be 20.3 percent, adjusted official estimates show 17.7 percent, 
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while Professor Wu's "composite series" reveals it to be 17.4 a nd Chao 
1Yuan-Li Wu , The Economy of Communist China, p. 113. 
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During the period 1952 to 1957, the electrical industry increased 
by 21.6 percent , coal by 14 . 6 percent, petroleum by 27.3 percent , ferrous 
metals by 28.7 percent, non-ferrous metals by 29.9 percent, metal 
processing by 22 . 1 percent, chemicals by 25. 7 percent, building materials 
by 19 .3 percent, textiles by 6. 5 percent, paper by 17. 1 percent, while 
the food industry and light industrial goods expanded by only 9 . 3 percent 
and 11. 8 percent. 1 These figures indicate that consumer goods expanded 
much slower than industrial goods. At the same time , the development 
pattern of industries was quite different from that of other developing 
countries. In China, unlike other developing nations, textiles is not a 
leading industry . Heavy industries are much more emphasized there. 
Taking the Great Leap period into account, industrial output took 
a substantially big stride in 1958 and 1959 (see Table 3 and 4). But again, 
these tables also reveal that production had increased at a decreasing 
rate in the years after 1958. Official data also concedes the fact. 
According to Professor Wu , there was a decline of 74 percent, 
in absolute terms, in 1961, and a further drop of 3 percent in 1962. 
Professors Hung and Wu have come to a conclusion that the economic 
1
chao, Kang, op. cit., p. 291. 
Table 4. Estimates of increases in indu s trial value product 1952-1960 
(in percent) 
Nature of 
value Total increase over Increase in 
Source 
of 
estimate product 1952-57 1957- 59 1957-60 1958 1959 1960 
gross 
Official ne t ('57)a ('52)a 
128.4 131. 5 177.3 66.3 39.2 29.0 
Liu-Yeh net ('52)a 94 . 2 51. 9 19.6 27 . 0 
Wu ~_:g. net ('52 )a 89 . 2 58. 1 82.9 19.5 32.3 15.7 
Chao Kang net ('52)a 85.9 71. 3 30.3 31. 5 
a price 
Source: Choh-Ming Li, "China's Industrial Development, 1958-1963," 
China Quarterly, No. 17 (January-March, 1964), p. 14. 
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Table 5. Estimates of increases in the value of output of modern industry and 
handicraft-1952-1959 (in percent) 
Source 
of 
es timate 
Liu- Yeh 
Wu,~t _:g. 
Chao Kang 
Offic ial 
Value 
product 
( 1952 price) 
net 
net 
net 
gross 
Increases over 1952- 57 
Modern Handicrafts 
140.2 14. 0 
134. 1 12. 5 
95.9 
152.4 85 . 4 
aChoh-Ming Li's interpolation from 1957 official data. 
Increases over 1957- 60 
Modern Handicrafts 
60.4 20.4 
71. 9 9.3 
89 . 6 
144.8a 
Source· Choh- ~1ing Ii "China' ~ l ndu q1Ti~J Development 1958-1963," China 
Quarterly, No. 17 (January-March , 1963), p. 14. 
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depression of 1961 and 1962 had died out by the end of 1962, and again 
the economy had picked up its speed thereafter. 1 
Handicrafts 
To the Chinese Communists , in confirmity with Marxist dogma, 
handicraft signifies a traditional and technically out-dated method of 
production which combines labor with a few simple tools and implements 
without the aid of machines. 2 Handicrafts do not create surplus value 
either, and so they were not attractive to the Communist planners . 
As depicted in Table 5, the increases in handicrafts were much 
smaller than in "mocern industries." During the First Plan , the in-
c r ease in "modern industries" was substantial, while that of handicrafts 
was not as spectacular . While over the period of 1957-1960, handi-
crafts made a fairly good progress, according to Liu-Yeh estimates, 
Wu, showed it declining. Official estmates show a considerable 
upward trend . The first two years of the Great Leap showed a rise, 
but Wu , shows that the handicraft value product dropped 8. 5 percent 
1Choh-Ming Li, "China's Industrial Development, 1958-
l9G:l " Thf' Ch ina.:_QL!.l_t.rte rly , No . 17 (January-March , 1964) , 
15 . 
2P eter Schran , "Handicrafts in Co mmunist China," The 
China Quarterly, No . 17 (January-March, 1964), 152. 
in 1960 and another 11 percent in 196 1, because of the agricultura l 
crisis. The decline ended in 1962. 1 
Industrial Structure 
On examining Chao Kang's figures given earlier in this chapter, 
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on percentage increase industry-wise, it is qutte evident that increases 
in different industries vary spectacularly, but that the metallurgical and 
the engineering industries have expanded faster than the textiles and the 
consumption industries. 
The composition of output, input of fac tors, and the scale of 
production give us sifficient information regarding structure . According 
to Liu, based on 1952 pr ices, the modern industrial sector' s share in 
the domestic product rose from 9 percent in 1933 to 14 percent in 1952 
and 24 percent in 1957. Tha t of agriculture declined from 50 percent 
in 1933 to 47 percent in 1952 and 41 percent in 1957 . 2 Thus , the industrial 
sector comprised nearly one-four th of the net domestic product by 1957, 
1choh-Ming Li, "China 's Indus tria l Development, 1958- 1963 , " 
p. 16. 
? 
- 'l a-.__tmng L1u, :otructura.l Changes in the Economy of the 
Chinese Mainland, 11 1933 to 1952-57 , 11 American Economic Review 
Papers and P roceedings, XLIX (May, 1959) , 86 . 
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while the figures available for the 1957-1960 period are in gross-value 
terms of all industry outputs (Table 6) Wu estimates show that by 1957 
industry contributed 20. 3 percent to the gross national product, and 
reached 29.5 in 1959, but declined to 14.5 percent in 1962. 1 The same 
source states that agriculture had contributed 39.2 percent in 1957, 
32 . 2 percent in 1959, and had risen to 47. 1 percent in 1962. This 
indicates that in the First Plan China had emphasized the industrial 
drive , but that the failure of the Great Leap in 1960 brought back the 
change toward agricultural development. 
The chief bottlenecks that appeared in the industrial development 
in 1958-1959 were the low quality of industrial goods produced, agri-
cultural calamities, and lack of adequate transportation. 
A number of new varieties of products have appeared in China, 
such as aircrafts , radio-electronic apparatus , television sets, high-
tensile structural steel , chemical fibre, and 72 , 500 k. w. hydro-
e lectnc power-genera ting equipment . These new products, along 
with uneven industri~.l development in China , have changed the eompo -
s i tJon of her outputs consicl<>rably. 
OF cia! da ta on mdus trial structure , 1957- 1960 (in 1957 price s ) 
J·· m J9 f>7 l958 1959 1960 
·- - ·- - --- - - ----------·------- ---- - - --
.r ,,s s value <l f all- industry ou):pu t 
lin billior yuan \ 
o np<.sttion by 
r , :luc·t,on method 
L . IodeJ'n 
?. . A anriic rafts 
'} aa1u ·e o!· or oduc t 
1.. HeaH indus try 
~ . r igh~ .ndus try 
ly lp,.. r a ting organiza tion 
L. Indu.;tr ia.l depart ments 
l. People 's communes 
a. Rural 
b. Ur ban 
By level of control 
l. Cen tr al 
2 . Local 
70.4 U 7.1 63. 0 210.0 
ln per centage 
- --- - -----"'"-== ="""---------
70. 6 74 .5 
29.4 25 .5 
48.4 57.3 
51.6 42.7 
100.0 94 .7 
0 5.3 
0 5.0 
0 0.3 
46 . 0 27.0 
54.0 73.0 
74. 6 
25.4 
58 . 7 
41.3 
92. 7 
7.3 
6.1 
1.2 
26.0 
74.0 
60. 5 
39.5 
91.0 
9.0 
7.1 
1.9 
Sour ce: Choh-Ming Li , "China's Industrial Development, 1958-1963," China Quarterly, No. 17 (January-
Mar ch, 1964), p. 14. 
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Changes in input structure are obvious from the relative in-
crease in capital and labor. During the first quinquennium, the in-
c rease in the fixed capital i n industry amounted to 21,400 million 
yuan (at 1952 prices) , while in 1958 it is es timated to be 11 , 763. 1 
Again . it is esti mated from the above figure s that by the end of 1958 
the amount of fixed capital in the e ntire industrial sector was around 
47 , 483 million yuan (at 1952 prices). 2 Thus , the amount of fixed 
capita l assets per worker for the industrial sector was raised from 
4 , 064 yuan in 1952 to 8, 472 yuan in 1958.3 
The higher degree of mechanization aggravated the shortage of 
ski ll ed lnbor. Although the number of industrial graduates had tripled 
during 1953-1957 , they were only 2. 2 pe rcent of the total industrial 
employment in 1957 . This is anothe r handicap in China's industria l 
effor ts. 
In the F ir st Plan, the e mphasis was on the Central Government-
operated enterprises, but Ta ble 6 shows that from 1957 onwards the trend 
had r evPrsed . 
l 
Ronald Hsia , "Growth and Structural Changes of Chinese 
Industry , " Conte m orar China , Ill (19!;0) , 60 . 
2Ibid. 
:li bi d 
Again from Table 6, we can conclude that the emphasis on the 
development of the heavy industries has been affected since 1958, but 
the gross value-product has increased from it by 1960. It may be ow-
ing to the longe r gestation period required for the heavy industries to 
run at capacity. 
There seems to be a gradual trend of decentralization in the 
operating or ganization in the industrial field. This may have been 
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a consequence of the policy of "walking on two legs" implemented in 1958. 
Iron and 1cc l l.Jclustry 
A large-scale industrial development program in a country 
cannot be carried out without establishment of an iron and steel 
industry. By developing the iron and steel industry, other allied 
industries will also be stimulated. Major raw materials needed for 
the steel industry are iron ore, coal, and scrap. 
Since the stee l industry has the greatest total linkage, Peking's 
plarmers gave it the utmost priority in allocation of materials, labor, 
and transportation facilities. There was a r ising demand for steel for 
farm 'mplements, transports stems, n w urban and rural commune-
~oonsored industries, and other construction projects. 
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Iron ore reserves of China a r e estimated to be 1 ,484 to 1, 821 
million tons by V. C. Juan. 1 Muzaffer Er Selcuk of tbe University 
of Purdue estimates it a t approximately 4 , 338 million tons, contai ning 
1, 537 million tons of metallic iron. 2 Of tbis estimate, around 3, 189 
million tons containing 1000 million tons of iron is in Manchuria . Only 
20 percent of this total is shown to be "economic ores" (ore that can 
be turned into pig iron at $60 or less per ton). 3 
China has sufficient reserves of limestone, dolomi te, manganese, 
tin, copper, zinc, tungsten , and otber raw materials to meet tbe demands 
on tbem to develop tbe steel indus try rapidly. China does not have 
sufficient quantities in earlier days. 11ms, China imports scrap from 
otber countries - especially Japan. 
The First Five Year Plan target of 4-12 million tons of steel 
and 4. 7 million tons of pig iron were surpassed by 1956. 4 The production 
of crude iron, by indigenious me thods, also rose from 30,000 tons in 
1vei Chow Juan, "Mineral Resourees of China, " Economic 
Geology, XIJ (June-July , 1946) 405. 
2Muzaffer Er Selcuk, " The Iron and Steel Industry in China ," 
Economic Geography, XXXII (October, 1956), 347. 
4Theodore Shnbad, "Chi na's Yea • n' the 'Great Le~p For-
ward " Far Eastern S~ •:.~ ill (Ju•1e. 19!>9: 92 . 
1952 to 593 , 000 tons in 1957. Local pig iron production also exceeded 
the planned target of 1. 730,000 tons for 1958. 
By the end of 1957 , the Soviet-bui It plants contributed appro xi-
mate ly 57 percent of Chi na ' s stee l production and 50 perce nt of coal 
output , 1 a lthough Russians had constructed only 3 of the 15 iron and 
42 
steel e nterprises planned for the period and only 27 out of 194 of th e coal 
plants planned. 2 This indicates that the Russian plants were larger 
a nd more efficient than those built by th e Chinese , and that the F irst 
Five Year Plan could not have been successful without them. 
Al the same time, the production of pig iron increased from 
1. 9 mi lli on tons in 1952 to 5. 9 million tons in 1957, and that of steel 
rose from 1. 4 to 5. 4 during the same pe riod. 3 
In 1958, when the "Great Leap" was formulated , the People's 
Daily r eported that regime's plan to develop 200 small converters and 
13 , 000 iron smelting furnaces by th e e nd o f 195 8. 
This small industry drive was planned to add 10 milli o n metric 
tons of steel-producing capacity and 20 million tons of pig - iron - producing 
1 Sidney Klein , "Recent Economic Exper ience in India and 
Communist China: Anotlwr Interpre tation ," American Economic 
Hev1""' i'apers and Proceedings , LV '~"c' 1965) , 36. 
3Theodore Shabad, Joe . c1t. 
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capacity. It was claimed in September , 1959, to have achieved only 4 
million tons increase in steel and 10 million in iron by the summer of 
1958. 1 In 1957 , the production of stee l ingots had reached only 5. 4 and 
pig-iron 5. 9 million. tons ; by 1958, they had reached a new height of 11 
and 13.7 million tons, respectively. 2 
Tbis policy of over-emphasis on steel production led to inter-
industry imbalance. By the end of 1958, the output capacity of steel 
industry was twice the steel demanded for the mad! ine-building 
industry. 3 
In 1959, 20. 5 million to ns of pig-iron were reported to have been 
produced, out of which around 1.1 million tons were produced by the small 
"modern" blast furnaces (which numbered around 1. 300 in 1960 bu ilt during 
1958-1959 . 4 Out of the total steel production of 13. 35 million tons, about 
4. 72 mi!IJOn , or 28 percent, came from small Bessemer converters. 5 
1Yuan- Li Wu, "Industriali zation under Chinese Communism," 
Current History, XXIX (December , 1960), 344. 
2Ibid. 
3Ronald Hsia , "Economic Changes in Communist China," The 
Political Quarterly , XXV (July-September , 1964) , 307. 
4Ibid. , p. 346 . 
This means that instead of 9. 53 million tons of pip;-iron produced in 
1958, from the "large" iro n and stee l mills, it had dropped to 9. 5 
million, while steel production had inceeased from 1958 production of 
million tons to 8. 63 million tons in 1959. 
The quality of iron and steel produced from the "small" plants 
and the " backyard furnaces " was drastically poor. Thus came the end 
of the "Great Leap Forward. " 
In 1960, Chinese official reports claimed the total production 
of steel to be at its new height of 18.5 million tons. 1 Of course , this 
included both the "large" and the "s mall" indigenous furnace production. 
I was later confessed that about 28 to :JO percent of the 196U leve l of 
production was not usable. 2 
Although China has not published her steel production figures 
since l::lbv , vis itors to that country have observed that her major iron 
and steel fi r ms ar e still operating at o nly about 50 to 60 percent of their 
3 
tormer capacity. 
I 
'A lexandra Close , "China Streamlines her Steel ," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, XXXXVJJ (March 4, 1.965) 365. 
2Colina MacDougall , " h n1 ~· '-t riv Progr ess , .. F:ar_Eas~!_n 
rcoP'> mic Review, LI (December 2, 19 5), 423. 
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Peking claimed that she was forced to cut down her steel 
production in 1961 , because of the exhaustion of raw materials - lime-
s tone , coal and iron ore. Never thel ess. it was a tremendous waste 
of manpower as well as the raw materials in the Great Leap Forward 
years. Secondly, she stated that the steel producing machinery had de-
teriorated and needed replacements and repairs . Naturally , this was 
the . direct consequence of the withdrawal of the Soviet aid and experts 
in 1960. The majority of her small plants, which had sprung up like 
mushrooms in the 1958-1960 period , gradually turned into ashes and 
rocks. China's low quality steel and iron production failed to meet 
the requirements of certain specialized industries. This was reflected 
in the rising imports of iron and steel plates and sheets, tubes, pipes, 
and so on, from Britain. The value of such imports increasingly 
mounted from 701.889 in 1962 , to 2, 322. 556 in 1963, and 2, 676.712 
in 1965 . 1 
·!Ibid. , p . 366 . 
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Coal Industry 
Leaving aside the vast manpower, coal is the most important 
source of energy m hina, because so far a ll the other alternative sources 
have rot been exploited enough . Although the hydro-electric power potential 
is very lar ge , it demands a high level of imtial investment. 
To meet the increasing demand for power in an industrializing 
country, the Chinese planners are faced with the problems of develop-
ment of alternative sources , expansion of coal production, and deve lop-
ing new coa l mines so as to elimi nate the cost of transportation and thus 
red uce the coal consumption by rai I ways. In 1960 . 40 percent of the 
total freight on railways was coal, amounting to about 288 million tons, 
out of the total output of 400 million tons. 
China's reserves of coal had been estimated by tbe National 
Geographical urvey in 1945 to be 265 , 311 million tons, but the 
Chinese clai med it to be l, 500,000 million tons in 1959. 
Prior to the u tbreak of the Si no-Japanese Wr~r in 1936, coal 
production in China and Manchuria had reached the estimated level of 
36 million tons. Owing to the wartime productio n drive, it had reached 
60 mil wn tons by 1943 . The Civil War wh1cb fo llowed reduced the output 
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to 15 million tons by 1946 . 1 By 1949, the figures had recovered to 32 
million tons. By 1952 , the dPmancl for coal was so great that the cur-
tailmenl of dJrect consumption of coal and rationing to households was 
the only means of redressing the balance . 2 
Much of the rehabilita tion process during the 1949- 1952 period 
was carried out with Russian assista nce. By 1950 , half of the mines 
had been calimed to have been mechani zed in Manchuria. 3 The Russians 
agreed to equip 27 coal mines and coal washing plants and extend expert 
advice in the field during the First F ive Year Plan. The Plan envisaged 
to increase the capacity to 112 . 9 million tons from the 1952 level of 66.5 
million . The Plan targe t was fu rthe e raised by 53. 85 million tons . 
In 1950 , the output obtained t.brough mechanized means accounted 
for only 4 percent of the total. By 1954 , the same figure had risen to 
33 . 6 percent. 4 It bas been claimed th a t by the end of 1958 , 90 percent of 
the lifting work and 97 percent of the ex1racting work was done by machines 
1D. J . Dwyer. "The Coa l lnrhmtry in Mainland Ch.ina Since 1949 ," 
The Geographical Journal , CXXJX (September, 1963), 331. 
3 
":::oa t," China New A.1al ~i_s , No. 167 (February 8. 1957) , 4. 
4 Th£udcre Shabad, China ' s Changi n~ (New Yor k: Frederick 
Pr;wg<>r , l9f>6) , p . 56 . 
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in the larger mines. 1 Introduc tion of hydraulic mining was an im-
portant innovation employed in the larger mines. 
Coal production forged up from 64. 7 million tons in 1952 to al-
most the double the level (130 million tons) in 1957. 2 
11w 1958's "walking-on-two-legs" policy of the "Gr eat Leap" 
encouraged local production by indigenous means. The number of local 
mines increased from 20,000 to 110 ,000 in 1958 alone; and some 20 
million people were working on it. The number of large mines (capacity 
above 30 , 000 tons per annum) were a lso increased. 
The coke production rose from 8 million tons in 1957 to 23 
million in 1958, but about 70 percent of the 1958 output came from 
indigenous mines, and so of low quali ty, mixed coal and rocks. 3 
This uneconomic situation was recognized in 1959 and about 80 
percent of the number of coal pits and 70 percent of the workers were 
1
owyer, op. cit., 332. 
2 Choh-Ming Li , " Economic Deve lopment ," The China Quarterly, 
No. 1 (January-March, 1960) 40; and Everett D. Hawkins , "China's 
Fuel and Power," Current History, XXV (Dece mber, 1958) , 337. 
3Andrew Nathan, " China's Lagging Coal Mines," Far Eastern 
Econonh c ReYiew, XXXXII (November 14, 1963), 354. 
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reduced in that year. 1 Nevertheless , the production of small mines 
had increased from 102. 6 million tons in 1958 to 142. 6 in 1959, and to 
261.2 in 1960, which amounted to 38,41 , and 65 percent of the total 
for each year, respectively. The more promising mines were mechanized. 2 
The better quality of coal from the " large" mines rose from 
167.4 million to 205.2 in 1959, but declined sharply to 138 . 8 million 
tons in 1960, owing to lack of co-ordination in planning and transporta-
tion facilities. Coal had piled up at the mines. 
Industrial consumption of coal in 1952 was 32 million tons, 
wh ich rose to 69 by 1957; and similarly, demand of coal for heating 
and cooking rose from 24 lo 52 million tons in the same period . 3 
Transnort 
,,part from the government weaknesses, the lack of an adequate 
transport system is the chief cause of China's backward s tate of industrial-
ization l>ofore 1949. 4 In China, the transport network is fairly well 
2
" F'uel Industry: Production , " China News Analysis, No. 371 , 
(Jun 2., 1961) 2. 
3
n wyer , lac. cit. 
Murphev. "China's Trnnsport Problem and Communist Planning," 
Economic Geography , XXX (January 1956). 11 . 
developed in the eastern coastal region, where industries and commerce 
flourished , but the hinterland has lacked transportation facilities. 
RailwayR did not develop fast enough-probably because the 
volume of goods transported r e mained almost stationary . Thus, 
the railroads, instead of earning greater profits, often entered into cut-
throat competition with the existing means of transportation. 1 This was 
especially true in the 1930's. 
On the local level , animal- and human-drawn carts, carrying 
poles. and such traditional means of transportation still form the back-
bone of China's distribution system, without which it would collapse. 2 
In 1949, the Peking regime undertook to restore the lines 
damaged during the war. Nearly half of the more than 17, 000 miles of 
operable railroads in 1952 were in Manchuria. The First Five Year 
Plan announced the target of adding 125,000 miles of new railway . 
Excluding Formosa, China had 17 ,5 70 miles of railroads at the end 
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of 1952 . This amounts to one mile of railroad for every 216 square miles 
1
sun. "The Pattern of RaiiWlly Development in China," The Far 
Eastern Quarterly XIV (February. 195B) 191. 
2Harold Munt.e-Kaas. "Roads a nd Rails in China," Far Eastern 
!:con· l!hC Review, U (Februar • 17 , 1%1>) ~n5 -276. 
of territor y and 39 miles of transportation for every 1, 000,000 people. 1 
On an average , approximately 1, 000 ki.lometers of railroad 
was constructed annually between 1949 and 1958 . The rate slowed down 
after tha t , a nd only 800 kilometers were constructed between 1960 and 
1962. Annually , about 1 , 300 k. m. were added between 1962 and 1965 . 
Sinkiang was joined to the network in 1963. Perhaps the total mileage 
of the railroads in China is around 36,000 kilometers in 1966 (excluding 
the forest railways) compared to 31,000 in 1958. 2 
China's largest locomotive plant is at Dairen. She produced 
steam locomotives of about 3, 000 h. p. until 1963, but since 1965 she 
has started producing 600 to 2 , 000 h. p. diesel locomotives. In 1958, 
it was reported that China produced 350 of her own locomotives. 
Passenge r cars in operation may be around 10,000, and freight cars 
about 150. 000 . In 1960 , China bought 50 steam locomotives from the 
U.S.S.R. , and in 1960 , 5 electric locomotives from France, who also 
electrified a 90 k. m. line in Szechuan Province. 3 
1E-Tll Sun , op. , cit., p. 179. 
2Harold Munthe-Kaas , ~ , p. 276. 
3Ibid. 
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Between 1949 and 1964, more than half the goods transported 
was done so by railroads, especially heavy industry and capital con-
struction goods, such as coal, minerals, construction materials, timber, 
cotton, and foodstuffs. 
As regards highways, the last figures issued on mileage were 
in 1958, being 400,000 k. m. as compared to 227,000 km. declared as 
fit for trucks in 1957. 1 Today they are estimated at 550,000 km. of 
which 200,000 km. are paved. 
F oreign visitors estimate about 250 to 300 thousand trucks, 
about 10 thousand buses , and 40 to 50 thousa nds passenger cars running 
on the Chinese roads. Chinese official production of cars in 1957 was 
7 , 500 . In 1964 the figure was 20,000, and in 1965 25,000 . 2 In 1965 
China imported from Russia 13 , 666 motor trucks, 1, 159 passenger cars, 
5 busses , and automobile parts, for a total amounting to 38, 824 thousand 
rubles. This total dropped to 5 , 048 rubles, consisting of 710 trucks, 
30 cars , and spare parts in 1961. In 1962, some 1,619 trucks and 141 
cars were imported worht 8,204 thousand rubles. 3 
1Ibid .• p. 325. 
2 Ibid., p. 326. 
3
colina MacDougall, "China: Motor Pick-Up, " !~!:....~~~.!!. 
Economic Review, XXXXIIII (Apri l 2, 1964). 40. 
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Petroleum Tnrlustrv 
China, as such, is very fortunate as far as endowment of 
petroleum is concerned. In the pre-war era, China's petroleum pro-
duction had reached its peak of 320 , 000 metric tons in 1943. In 1949, 
it had fallen down to 122,000 tons , and thereafter recovered to 436,000 tons 
in 1952. 1 
Tile F irst Five Year Plan (1953-1957) had put up its larges t 
at 2 million tons. Despite the heavy capital investments, the performance 
was not up to the mark. Actual annual output more than doubled between 
1952 and 1955, to 966, 000 tons, but reached the level of only 1. 41 
million tons by 1957, giving an increase rate of 325 percent for the whole 
period . 2 It was, nevertheless, calcuated by keeping a low base figure . 
During this period, the inexperience of the Chinese labor force 
in this field , shortage of petroleum technologists, and poor quality of 
equipment used r esulted in the s low progress in this industry. Poor 
performance in the production during the First Five Year Plan led the 
1Brian Heenan , " China's P etroleum Industry (II)," Far 
Eastern Econom1c Review, L (Octob 1 14, 1965) , 93. 
2rbid. 
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policy-makers of Peking to raise the target for the Second Plan to 5 
and 6 million tons by 1962 . 1 
In 1959, the official Chinese c la im had risen from 2. 26 million 
to 3. 7 million , and by 1960 it further expanded to 5 . 5 million tons, accord-
ing to a Russian journal. 2 
There have been no official figures released after 1960, and 
the available estimates are varying. In light of new discoveries claimed, 
development of older oil fields, better equipment supplied and greater 
trained labor force, better transport system, it is estimated that the out-
put reached 6. 5 million tons in 196 1, 6. 8 to 7 million in 1962 , and 7. 5 
million in 1963. 3 
Chinese official data refer to the total oil output and m ake 
no distinction between synthetic and liquid oils. Foreign visitors estimate 
that about a third of China's home production of all oils come from coal 
1Colina MacDougall , "China: The Oil Scene," Far Eastern 
Economic Review , XXXIX (January 10 , 1963). 51. 
2 . Ib1d. 
:3 Heenan, op . c i t. . p . 94. 
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and shale. On this basis , Wei estimated that about 2 million tons of shale 
oil was produced in 1961. 1 
Quite a number of new r efineries have been established since 
1957. The ones at Lanchow and Shanghai are among the large ones. 
The oil refining capacity is not ye t lmown. 
This drive for production increase in oil shows China's despera-
tion to become self-sufficient in her petroleum supply. In 1958, the 
volume of imported oil exceeded domesti.c production. Two-thirds of 
China ' s estimated output of 7 million tons was imported in 1963 . 2 
Oil ba s been one of the most important items of the Sino-
Sovie t trade. In 1950 it accounted for 12 percent of the total annual 
import trade by value and was placed third in importance after the 
"complete plants" and the "other equipment. " By 1960 it topped the list 
and accounted for one-third of the value of all imports from the U.S.S.R. 
Since the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1960, Sino-Rumani an trade has 
more than tripled, and Rumania is likely to replace Russia as the source 
1Anton W. T. Wei, "Minerals in China 1961 . " The Mining 
Journal (London} April 6 , 1962, p. 3 ; F •·om Heenan, loc .. cit.; a lso 
Theodore Shebad , "Chlna's Year of the Great Leap Forward." Far 
Easter·n Survey, XXVITI (June, 1959}, 94. 
2Heenan , loc. cit. 
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of oil. China is getting some crude oil from Albania , and is searching 
for some oil from Algeria a lso. 
The amoun t of oil availa bl e for consumption has risen from 3. 2 
million tons in 1957, to 8. 8 million in 1960, and 9. 7 million in 1963. 
Domestic production may have supplied 44 pe rcent in 1957 , 62 percent 
in 1960 , and more than 70 percent of consumption demands in 1963. 
This shows that China is striving hard to depend less on foreign sources 
for her oil. 1 
Assuming a population of 700 million, and the oil available 
for consumption being 9. 7 million tons in 1963, the annual per capita 
consumption of oil is 4-5 American gallons, much below 17-2 0 gallons 
average for the whole of the Far East , J apa n (130 ga llons) , the Soviet 
Union (200 gallons) and the United States (900 gallons). 2 
Most of China's oil fields are situated in the deep west , while 
the overwhelming demand comes from the industrial east. Since China's 
transport system is not yet well developed, distribution of oil is a pro-
blem the economy continues to face. 
As China becomes further indus trialized, she will have to in-
crease her supply of petroleum. 
1Ibid. ' p . 95. 
CHAPTER ill 
THE COURSE OF INDUSTRIAL GROWTH 
The First Five Year Plan 
How could China, a country with such meager per capita in-
come , procure such a high rate of industrial development ? Will s he 
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be able to sustain such a high rate of growth for a long period of time? 
These are the questions posed by many individuals in developing countries . 
Further answers to these questions are at tempted in the chapter on capital 
formation. 
In the pre-Communist era, China's industries were consumer 
oriented ; the heavy industries, transport system , and the power supply 
industries were less developed. China , like most other deve loping 
nations, had to depend on free international trade for her economic 
needs . According to T. C. Lin and K. C. Yeh , the consumer's goods 
industries produced 81. 9 percent while producer's goods industries' 
output was 18. 9 percent of the total output of the modern industrial sector. 
Factories (modern sector) produced 0. 64 billion (1933 yuan) worth 
oi output in 1933, and handicraft produced 2. 04 billion worth in the same 
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year. 1 I 1 1936, 74 percent of the total industrial capital was foreign-
owned. The confiscation of the Japanese-owned firms after the Sino-
Japanese War hiked state-owned capital to 67.3 percent, as compared 
to 32. 7 percent private capital. 2 The capital market and business ad mini-
stration were not well developed during this period. Thus, China possessed 
the commonly found characteristics of an underdeveloped country. 
No sooner had the Communists taken over in 1949 than they 
brought about revolutionary changes :n the economy. They uprooted the 
ancient institution of private property . The land the industrial enter-
prises were socialized by 1956. In their First Five Year Plan, they 
gave a very high priority to the industrial sector and committed them-
selves to obtaining the support of the people. This emphasis on in-
dustrialization was mt prudent on the part of the planners. By 1956, 
prices in general had risen five times since 1936; and the prices of 
scarce producer's goods were higher than the rest. 3 Thus, the prices 
1 Ta-Chung Liu and Kung- Chia Yeh, The Economy of the Chinese 
Mainland: National Income and Economic Development, 1933-1959 (Prince ... 
ton , New J ersey: Princeton University Press, 1965) p. 66. 
? 
~v"""l-Li Wu, The Economy of Communist China, 117. 
3
choh- i\.L L , Economic Development of Communist China: 
An Appraisal of :•,, F ir'3t Five Years of Industrialization (Berkeley, 
California: · Uni··;,o"sitv of California Press, 1959), p . 42. 
Table 7. China's petroleum imports, 1950-1963 
(M/Tons 1000) 
From the 
U.S.S.R. 
From 
Rumania 
Crude oil 
Oil products 
Total 
Total 
Grand total 
aEs timated 
1950 1957 
38.9 380.4 
144.3 1422. 2 
183.2 1802.6 
1958 
672.0 
1835. 3 
2507.3 
1958 1960 1961 1962 1963 
636 . 9 567 . 6 
2412. 3 2395. 2 2428.2 1856.4 14 08. 0 
3048.2 296 2. 8 2928.2 1856 J4 1408.0 
350.0 700.0 1000.0a 1300.0 
3312.8 3628.2 2856.4 2708.0 
Source: Brian Heeman, "China ' s Petroleum Industry II ," Far Eastern Economic Review, L(October 14 , 
1965), p. 94. 
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of inrlusl l'ial ~oods were much higher in China than in other industrial 
t!O ll lll.l'iCS. .J i<> implies lhal the emphasis given to rapid industria l 
clevclopmonl in China had unde rmined the importance of reaping com-
parative advantage through international trade which would have been 
possible , had it been a free-economy. Consequently , the cost of r a pid 
industrialization was high. A major share of this cost in terms of be low-
subsistence consumption was forced upon the people of China by her 
leaders. 
The share of producer's goods rose to 43 percent in 1952 from 
18.9 in 1933 , and further to 57 in 1957. In 1959, 69 percent of total 
industr ial prorluction consisted of producer's goods . On the other hand, 
the share of handicrafts had fallen during the First Five Year Plan. 
On the one hand , a production drive e mphasis was ·~ i' <>non the 
heavy industr ia l sector. On the other hand, the re was a lack of co-
ordination in inter-industry planning. During the last two years of the 
First Plan , there was a shortage of electric power, crude oi l , iron and 
steel , coal and such basic industrial inputs. The supply had not in-
creased enough to meet the rising demand of machine tool and me tal 
working industry. 
Among the light industries, only the paper industry had exceeded 
its quota. The remaining ones in this category fared poorly, such as 
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cotton cloth , sugar, wheat flour . These are the goods of daily use for the 
people. 
As stated earlier, the initial rise in physical output during the First 
Plan was ov.ing to the expansion of the industrial labor force. Later, the 
increase in productivity was a factor that played an important part, as 
technical experience was obtained. This may not be so for the Great 
Leap years. 
The Great Leap was characterized by the indigenous techniques 
of production , labor-intensive methods, and small-scale local operations. 
According to official sources, three-fourths of the economy's coke, one-
half of its iron ore and pig iron , one-third of its crude steel , and one-
sixth of its cement was produced by these methods in 1959. 1 But about 
30 to 40 percent of output by this method was found of too low a quality 
to be of any use. The Great Leap psychology had led the planners a nd 
the local auUwrities to revise the targets upward during the 1958-1959 
period, which dislocated the planning machinery. During this period, 
labor was used highly uneconomically. For instances, it took 50 to 60 
days to turn out one metric ton of poor quality iron from a tiny local 
1Ronald Hsia, "Economic Change in Communist China," The 
Poli'ic::tl Quarterly, XXXV (July-September , 1964), 301. 
furnaceJ A ~cording to Kang Chao. in 1958, more than 100 million 
people was mobilized to construct dams , irrigation pr.o.iects. and so 
on, without advance survevs and proper designs. 2 Millions of people 
were eng"aged in digging iron-ore and coal from the indigenous mines 
and constructing " back-yard furnaces" which were destroyed with the 
end of the Great Leap. 
There was an enormous waste of labor power as well as the 
industrial raw materia ls . Some industries had over-produced , while 
others cou ld not work their plants at capacity. The inadequate trans-
port system ap;gravated the s itua tion. As a result, the indus tr ies in 
Communist China e ngaged th emselves in a vertical diversifica tion after 
19:>8. Under decentrali zed ad ministration, they established "satelli te 
plants" around the main plants in order to supply the main plants with 
mater ials needed. Thus , railway bureau s began to run cement plants, 
steel mills, and so on. Ce ment mills began to build paper mills and so 
on to supply their own needs . 3 In about one year, thousands of industry 
1From Peking Review, March 3, 1959, p. 5. quoted by Honald 
H 1< 1 ~ , l!Jid . 
2Chao Kang , "Economic Aftermath of the Great Leap in 
L .... l.La l... ... t Clue; , 0 sian Survey, J,- 'iVI·, ,·, l m:i4) 854. 
3Ibid . , pp . 85tH~5 7 . 
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complexes grew up like mushrooms, trying to produce multitudes of 
material inouts that the nucleus plants were in short supply of. The 
agricultural crisis and the disequilibrium created by the policy of 
"walking on two legs" brought an end to the Great Leap. 
Great Leap Backward 
With the withdrawal of Soviet technical and material aid in 1061 , 
the policy of the industrial priority was shifted to agricultural priority. 
With this returned a greater reliance on such capitalistic elements of 
agricultural improvements as keeping production cost under control, 
improvement in quality of goods produced, greater emphasis on techni-
cal training , expansion of the fertilizer industry, farm machinery pro-
duction, and so on. 
In 1962, the uutput of steel rose 7 million tons, and chemical 
fertilizers 2. 05 million tons. Other preliminary estimates have claimed 
the aggregate output of modern industry at 72 billion yuan in 1962. This 
is equal to 76 percent of the 1960 output of 94. 5 billion yuan. 1 Al though 
figures have not been released since 1960 , it is expected that industrial 
production may have fallen to a low of 39 .1 billion yuan in 1961. 2 This 
1Yuan-Li Wu , The E r.onomv of Con1munist China, p. 123. 
"I' 
indicates that the reorientation of policy did help the economy in picking 
up again, after the confusion of the "Great Leap" and the depression that 
followed it . 
The Chinese Communists realized after the Great Leap that 
economic deve lopment was nol somethinll; that they could achieve as 
fast as they expected. The Great Leap was undertaken with the aim 
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of surpassing the British level of output within the following fifteen years; 
but their experiment left them frustrated. After 1961, the Chinese 
planners were sobered. From that point , their targets were moderate 
indeed! 
CI!APTER IV 
CAPITAL FORMATION 
The rapid rate of industrial growth in China during the First 
Plan owes its alligiance to the high rate of capital for mation in the 
country. This was made possib le in China through the coercive 
methods by the Communists. 
Capital accumul ation presupposes an increase in the volume 
of real savings, so that the increase in production id directed into in-
vestment programs. It also presupposes finance and credit facilities 
to enable the inves tment programs to be carried out . Again , it assumes 
that profitable investments are made, so that further accumulation is 
made postiiule . 
WhJ ,~ capi tal-output ratios vary in different countries, a 
group of Uniled Nations experts used a ratio ranging from 2:1 to 5:1. 1 
The Indian five - year plan suggested an average capital -output ratio of 
3:1 , Professor Kurihara assumes a 5:1 ratio, and Rosenstein-Hodan 
1 United Nations, Measures for the Economic Development of 
Und<o-rae·leloped Areas (, 'ew York., 1951) , p. 47. 
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estimates that the ratio is at least 3: 1 or 4: 1. 1 It is the ratio tha t shows 
the relationship between the units of input of capital and the resulting 
output of goods. 
Assume that a given capital-output ratio is 3:1, and the rate of 
increase in population growth is 2 percent. If a country wants to raise 
its pe r capita ' income by 2 pe rcent , she should be saving and investing 
3 x 4 perce nt , or 12 percent of its national income every year. 
There are a number of ways by which capi tal accumulation 
can be increased. One way is to restrict domestic consumption, 
through a high rate of taxation. A second is through compulsory saving 
schemes- selling people government securities and so on. A third 
device is restriction of the leakage through imports as the per capita 
income rises and the margina l propensity to import and the diversifi-
cation of demand rise. Development through inflation is a fourth method, 
as prac ticed in Brazil. This could be a dangerous way of developing a 
nation if the inflation gets out of hand. A fifth technique is the removal 
of disguised unemployed labor from the agricu ltural and other sectors 
to the industrial sector, where the produ ctivity is higher; or their 
1 Gerald M. Meier and Hobert E. Baldwin, Economic Development: 
Iheo s:,c , Histo ry , Policy (New York: J ohn Wil ey & Sons, Inc., 1957) , 
~\ :,:· ~ . 
transferral to the building of social overheaa eaptlal projects. Such a 
move ment would have to be accompanied by a rise m productivity in 
the agricultural sector, so as to feed this increasing non-agricultural 
labor force . 1t ai~o pre-supposes the pr esence of incentives for the 
agricuitu1'IH !aoorers to work harder-putting in more hours of work. 
F ore tgu ocononnc aid can also help the oounu y in breaking through the 
vicious circle of poverty. It can release domestic resources for in-
vestment purposes. Lastly, international trade is an important means 
of capital formation, nevertheless, it is not absolutely essential to 
have a favorable term of trade for economiC development of a country . 
With an improvement in the terms of trade a country can earn greater 
imports . It can give priority to capital imports over consumption goods . 
H can e mphasize export mdustries in order to create an export surplus. 
A developmg nation often imposes exchange controls, tariffs, and other 
controls to pr event valuable foreign exchange from being used in pur-
chasing coll sum1., ion goods or relatively less productive capital goods. 
A low capi ta l-output ratio is also important in increasing s aving~. for 
it s hows no w much capital is n eded per uni o increase in output. A 
low ra tio i ndicates the productiviiy of capital. 
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Capital Inves tment 
China 's rapid industrialization program was carried out dm ing 
the first plan , followed by a sort of boom during the Great Leap, nncl then 
a slump after 1959. An attempt is made here to determine the rate of 
investment and the utilization of funds by s ectors. External econom1c aid 
will be dealt with in a later chapter. 
Fixed investment is defined to include a ll additions and major 
repairs to buildings and productive faciliti es . It excludes changes in 
inventories and procurement of mil itary equipment. 
Under the Chinese Communist system the government makes 
the base inves tment decis ions for the who le eeuno my . About 12,000 
m illion yuan was inves ted by pr ivate businessme n and peasants. About 
60 percent of this went into investments in fixed assets. 1 This amount 
became insignificant by the end of 1956, when the socialization of private 
business was completed . 
Total domestic gross savings mounted steadily (with one hPtback 
2 in 1955) and have averaged 22 percent of GNP in the past few years . 
1Far Eastern Economic Review, XIX (January 2, 1958), 13. 
2Wilfred Malenbaum J "Indian and China: Contrasts in Development 
P edor.mance , " The AmericatEconomic Review, XLIX (June , 1959), il04. 
Pro!. Me 'enbaum takes in to ~ c~nu1nt t.he fir ~t phtn ~nd the year l 'lf\S in 
f• .... , f !7" re. 
At the same time, China's population has been rising at a rate of 2 to 
2 1/ 2 percent. 1 This is indeed a remarkable rate of saving, given the 
very low level of income, it ,.,.,s possible only under a centralized 
totalitarian system of government, which could depress consumption 
expenditure to the subsistence level. 
Between 1950 and 1959 the rate of investment, as a proportion 
of total output, increased rapidly. Between 1950 and 1952, the rate of 
forced investment more than doubled. Over the first five year plan , 
it nearly tripled , from 6. 4 billion yuan in 1952 to 18 . 2 in 1957. It 
was at its highest in 1956 ,during the first year of the Great Leap, it 
jumpted from 18 . 2 yuan to 33 . 0 million yuan- an unprecedented rise 
of nearly 15 billion yuan within a year . 
During the first plan, investment was emphasized. By 1957, 
the rate of investment had reached nearly 16 percent. This was still 
lower than that of the Soviet Union, which was 18-19 percent in 1928, 
before her first plan. 2 
1Dick Wilson , "Counting the Heads," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, LI (January 6 , 1966) 22. 
2Abram Bergson, The Real National Income of Soviet Russia 
Sir.cr~ (Cambridge: Harvar d University Press , 1961) p. 88. 
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Chinese Communist planners' impatience is reflected in their 
rate of investment as a percent of their gross national product in 1958. 
Japan could rot reach this stage until after the second World War. Nearly 
one-fourth of their gross income was invested in the 1958-1959 period, 
and eventually reached a level of investment which was too great for the 
Chinese economy to absorb. As a consequence, the Great Leap movement 
fell to pieces by 1960. 
Gross F'ixed Investments in the "Modern" l '1dustrial Sector 
The "modern" sector is rather capital-intensive , consuming 
electric or mechanical power, as opposed to the labor-intensive tra-
ditional sector. This discussion includes public utilities, modern 
transport and communications, and individual handicrafts, but also 
includes military construction, and investment in science, culture, 
education , and health. 1 Estimates of investment in modern equipment 
in handicrafts is also included. 
The underlying cause of the rapid industrial development is 
glaringly evident in the high rate of investment in heavy industry. 
1w. W. Hollister, "Capital !•'ormation in Communist China", 
China Quarterly, No. 17 (January-March , 1964) , 42. Also China's 
Gross National Product and Social Accounts, 1950-1957 (Glencoe, 
Tllinois : The Free Press. 1958). 
The emphasis on the heavy industry is obvious right from the very be-
ginning of the first plan. Investment in heavy industry doubled between 
1950 and 1952 . It reached 45 percent of the total fixed investment in the 
first year of the Great Leap and then declined a little 111 1959. 
Ol the total fixed investment the "modern" sector absorbed 
about half of the resources in 1950 . The proportion rose to nearly 
66 percent, or two-thirds of all investments, by 1959. Over the first 
five year plan (1953- 1957) the average investment in heavy industry 
was more than 57 percent of total fixed investment. In the two years 
of th e Great Leap it touched 65 percent. 
Within the category of heavy industry, investment was designed 
to expand the established heavy industrial enterprises and to build new 
establishments to produce goods that were rot produced earlier in China. 
This was true especially in the field of the heavy industry and machine 
tools. In the light and consumption industry goods , the emphasis 
was mainly on the segments already established. No efforts were made 
toward establishing new product enterprises in this sphere. 
These ·1ew industries" in the heavy industry sector were en-
tire ly dependent on Soviet technical assistance and Soviet delivery of 
com lP e plants and equipment. Over the t irs t plan period, about half 
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of the heavy industrial investment was in Soviet-assisted pro-
jects . 1 
About one-fourth to one - third of the investment in heavy 
industries wont to the i3 .all-8eale Pmjects during the period of 
195 - l D59 2 
Gros s Fixed Investment in the Traditional Sector 
Chinese planners made little effort toward agricultural develop-
me nt in the hope that with little inves tment in this area the output 
could be easily raised. There was also fear that a high rate of mechan-
ization on farms would displace the vast labor for·ce. Thus , they con-
centrated on irrigation projects. Agricultural operations were left 
to be developed by traditional methods. 
The dec line of total investment in the traditional sector has 
been due to the decline in non-agricultural investment in tradem hous-
ing, communal services, and government construction. 2 There was 
1First Five Year Plan For Development of the National 
Economy of the People's Republic of China in 1953-1957 , (Peking: 
Foreign Language Press , 1959) , p. 98. 
2Hollister, op. cit., p. 43. 
31bid . ' p. 44. 
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A substant1al declme in the agricultural sector from 1950 to 1953. Since 
a commence ment on the first five year plan , down to 1959 , there was 
more or less a constant rate of investment (one-fourth) as a proportion 
of the gross national product. 
ln absolute terms , the rate of agricultural investme nt more 
than doubled be tween 1952 and 1956 , reaching approximately 4. 7 billion 
1 
yuan in 1956 . By 1959 it had reached 10 billion yuan. 
Investment and Depression 
In 1960 the annual plan announced the state investment was 
planned to be 20 percent higher than the very high levels of 1959. Other 
sectors were expected to get the same allocation of investment. 2 These 
figures were probably revised w1th the realization of agricultural fail-
ure of 1959 . At the same time Soviet aid had dried up by the summer 
of 1960 . 
There "as a considerable overinvestment in agriculture and 
the Small-Scal e heavy industries during the Great Leap period. Their 
ate of investrn nt declined from 26.6 in 1959 to 10-13 percent in 1961 
1
rbid .• p . 45. 
2 Ibid., p 49 . 
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Table 8 . Gross fixed investment by sectors, 1950-1959 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Total gross fixed 
inve stment 
Billion yuan 2.4 4.0 6.4 10.5 12.5 13 . 0 19. 1 18.2 33.0 38.5 
Percent of GNP 5. 5 6.4 9.1 12. 4 13.9 13.8 17.9 15.9 23.9 25.7 
Modern investment 
Billion yuan 1. 18 2.15 3.61 5.70 6.94 7. 48 11. 34 11. 12 21. 24 25.31 
Percent of total 
fixed investment 48.8 54.45 56.5 54.5 55.4 57.5 59.3 61. 1 64.3 65.7 
Heavy industr~ 11. 6 12.6 23.4 24.5 27.6 31.9 33 .9 36.9 45. 1 44.3 
Otber sectors 37.2 41. 8 33.1 30.0 27.8 25.6 25 .4 24.2 19 .2 21.4 
Tra ditional investment 
Billion yuan 1. 24 1. 80 2.78 4. 76 5. 59 5. 52 7.77 7. 07 11. 79 13.21 
Percent of total 
fixed invgstment 51.2 45.6 43 . 5 45.5 44.6 42 .5 40.7 38 .9 35.7 34.3 
Agriculture c 45 . 2 38.7 34.6 26.2 26.6 28.3 24 . 4 25.2 26.4 26.6 
Otber sectors 6.0 6.9 8.9 19. 3 18 . 0 14.2 16.3 13.7 9.3 7. 7 
a 
Light industry, public utilities; military construction; investment in science, culture; education; and health; 
bmode rn transportation and communications. 
cAgr icultural investmeilts ,iriclude investments ·in rural housing and services. . 
Government cons truction, trade, and non-agricultural investment in housing and communial services. 
Source: William W. Hollister , " Capital Formation in Communist China," The China Quarterly, No. 17 
(January- March, 1964) , pp, 40, 42, 45, 51. 
__, 
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(agriculture) and 11 percent to 9 percent in 1961 in heavy Small Scale 
industries. As a consequence of the Sino-Soviet dispute , Soviet aid 
and technicians were withdrawn. Because of the agricultural crisis 
of 1959-1960 and the necessity of increasing imports of food , invest-
ment in heavy industry declined. This led to a cut in the production 
of heavy industries producing inputs for the heavy industrial sector. 
Again, as a result of a fall in heavy industrial goods the investment 
in transport and communications also declined. Thus, the Great 
Leap ended in a depression by 1961. There was a 46-54 percent 
1 
decline in total fixed investment, as compared with that of 1959. 
This was due in part to the over-investment during the Great Leap 
period and the lack of absorptive capacity in the economy. 
Caoital-Outout Ratio 
The ratio of gross investment to the increase in gross pro-
duct has been 2. 2 over the 1950-1957 period, 2 . 5 over the first 
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plan period , 1. 4 in the pre-first-plan period, and 1. 7 in the post-first 
plan period. 2 This reveals that Chinese productive efficiency was greater 
1Ibid .. p. 51. 
2Malenbaum, op. cit. , p. 298. 
during the pre-plan period. One of the reasons for the decrease in 
efficiency was that heavy industries have a longer gestation period 
before they actually run efficiently at their capacity. The Russian-
built plants began to run at their capacity later. The ratios for the 
post-Great Leap period are not available, but certainly the efficiency 
must have declined in that period also. 
Nevertheless, Chinese capital-output ratios depict a much 
greater degree of efficiency than what is generally found in most 
developing economies. In that sense there has resulted a kind of 
savings for the economy. 
Methods Used 
From the beginning the Chinese Communists tried to gain 
complete control over the economy . Since Communist philosophy 
requires bringing a drastic cut in consumption and rise in investment, 
the whole economy must be tightly controlled . 
The "Three Anti" and "Five Anti" movements of 1951-1952 
gave leaders complete powers to allocate raw materials and finances. 
Private voluntary savings almost vanished. Funds were obtained 
by the regime through the following means (given in order of their 
probably quantative importance in 1952): commercial and industrial 
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taxes (mostly in kind) compulsory purchases of government bonds , con-
fiscation, and new note issues. 1 
The regime also was in a firm control of all large-scale 
trading activities and was thus in a position to fix prices arbitrarily. 
Prices of manufactured goods were raised, while in the agricultural 
sector the government occupied a monopsonistic position and so under-
valued prices. Prices of modern manufacturing products in 1952 were 
roughly four times as high as in 1933, handicraft prices 2. 3 times, and 
agricultural prices only 1. 8 times. 2 Thus, the terms of trade went 
against the peasants. 
To create additional savings and capture the gains arising from 
the r ising productivity and distributive efficie ncy, wages were kept below 
the productivity of labor. 3 
Since the governme nt used agricultural products as raw materials 
in state enterprises, it profited by buying the raw materials at a low price 
and selling finished goods at much higher prices . 
1Ta-Ching Liu , "Structural Changes in the Economy of the Chinese 
Mainland . 1933 to 1952-57," American Economic Review Papers and Pre-
ceedings, XLIX (May, 1959) 88. 
2Ibid. 
3Ronald Hsia, "Economic Changes in Communist China", Political 
~Ij,Eg,!y , XXXV (July-September , 1964) , 300. 
T he collectivi zation of agriculture and the socialization of 
industry were essential to facilitate the for ced savings program. 
Th people's communes were formed to make e ffective use of the exist-
ing surplus labor and to make labor available in greater quantities . 1 
Thus the burden of capital for mation was pretty heavy on the peasants, 
through direct taxation of government purchases of " surplus" agri-
cultural products a t low fixed prices and by the high prices of the manu-
factured goods that he had to pay for. 
These were the prime me thods used by the Chinese in bringing 
about such a high rate of investment over the first plan period. 
Birth of the Great Leap Forward 
The Chinese Communists neglected agricu ltural modernization 
during the first plan, but at the same time they failed to imple ment any 
positive population control methods. Thus, at the end of the first plan 
they were m danger of be ing caught in the " low-level equilibrium trap. 112 
2Richard R. Nelson , "A Theory of the Low-Level Equilibrium 
Trap ," Amer ican Economic Review, XLVI (December, 1956), 894 . 
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A lhe same time they sensed that dependence on Soviet economic aid 
was risky . The rate of capital formation was low and there was a wide-
spread disguised employment. 1 The shortage of iron and steel was re-
tarding industrial development. 
The problem faced by the Chinese planners was , following the 
interpretation of Professor R. S. Eckaus' " Theory of Factor P oportions 
in Underdeveloped Areas ," that of an inadequa te capital-intensive and 
fixed co-efficient sector. The economy could rot absorb a ny more labor 
unless more capital was poured in. According to this theory, e mploy ment 
opportunities were inhibited because there was a scarcity of capital. The 
"relative ly plentiful labor is the n pushed into the cariable-co-effi cient 
sector and absorbed there as long as mar gina l value productivity of labor 
is higher than the wages it r eceives. "2 Thus, in what probably led to the 
birth of the G reat Leap Forward there was furthe r extension of the tech-
nological dualism. 
1Hollister, ~. p. 48. 
2R. S. Eckaus, "Factor P roportions in Underdeveloped Areas ," 
Ame rican Economic Review, XLV (Septe mber , 1955) , 559-560 . 
Nurksg Model 
Professor Ragnar Nurkse's theory of capital formation is that 1 
in the over populated countries , the marginal pro-
duct of labor in agnculture is zero; a considerable 
amount of rural surplus labor can therefore be 
removed without reducing total agricultural output and 
can be put to use in construction of productive capital 
goods, such as roads and irrigation works. Since agri-
cultural output is rot reduced by the removal of surplus 
labor, there will be more food for those remaining 
on the land, and a food surplus can then be used to feed 
those engaged in productive construction work. "Dis-
guised unemployment" therefore provides "concealed 
savings" which can be used to build productive capital 
goods in a "costless" way, and this without any fundamental 
improvements in agricultural techniques. 2 
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According to Professor Hla Myint , "disguised unemployment" did 
not yield zero productivity, but the labor force was "under-employed. " 
Thus, removing this under-employed labor meant longer hours of work 
for the ones that remained on the farms . 3 This is exactly what happened 
in China during 1958-1959 period. Private plots were abolished in the 
agricultural cooperatives and so were the free markets. The time that 
1 Ragnar Nurkse , Problems of Capital Formation in Under-
developed Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), 
pp. 32-49. 
2Hia, Myint , The Economics of the Developing Countries 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965) p. 86 . 
3Ibid., pp. 87-90 . 
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the peasants devoted to these plots was drastically encroached upon under 
the pressure from the G reat Leap Forward, and the time for sleeping 
and family subsidiary occupations was reduced . 1 This continued more 
vigorously after the establishment of the communes. 
Following Professor Nurkse's model of capital formation, the 
Chinese tried to capture all the increase in marginal product at almost 
zero marginal cost. They created employment for the "under-employed" 
labor by expanding small-scale industries in iron and steel, fertilizer 
production, power generation , traditional textile and food processing 
industries, coal digging , and so on . By employing them on labor-
intensive projects, such as irrigation , and intensive methods of a.gri-
cultural production. These industries used simple equipment , manu-
fa.ctured locally, and utilized local raw material. The production of 
goods were to satisfy rural needs for manufactured and agricultural 
requirements. 
During the Great Leap , repair shops and spare-part manu-
facturing were closed down, and this labor was shifted to build dams , 
irrigation works, and so on. The lack of the repair facilities hampered 
1Dwight H. Perkins, "Centralization and Decentralization in 
Mainland China's Agriculture , 1949-1962" , The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, LXXVIII (May , 1964). 229 . 
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industrial production. Th re was a shor tag o f labor in heavy and small-
scale industries for raw material , for the labor was extensively shifted 
to the indigenous projects . 
As a result of the abrupt declin m investment in 1960- 1961 , 
there occurred a widespread exodus of worker s who had been drawn into 
non-agricultural occupations , back to agriculture. The Great Leap re-
sulted into a huge social and economic dislocation. 
It \lias rot until 1963 that the economy had r e turned to a normal 
state of affairs . Chinese planners cam to realize that it was not a 
series of Great Leaps that they needed to overtake Britain's level of 
output in a short period of lime, but consistent and well-coordinated 
plans . 
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CHAPTER V 
CENTRALLY PUNNED GROWTH 
Ideology and Planning 
In applying his theory of historical dialectical materialism , Karl 
Marx analyzes the process of economic growth as a social process of material 
transformation. 1 Propounding his theory of thes1s , anti-thesis , and synthesis, 
he forecasts the inevita ble struggle between the bourgeousie and th proletariat 
ultimate ly resulting in a new state led by a few "enlightened" wor kers, in which 
a ll means of production are socialized. 
According to Marxist-Leninist theory , as interpreted by Professor 
Peter Schran , 
Socialization of production removes a ll class barriers . 
and so, increases productive potential of the society . 
This tmplies not only the socia l• zation of the means of 
production , but that of peoples' minds also . It is the 
duty of the Party to lead the peopl on the " road towards 
socialism", wh1ch would make a ll me mbers of the 
society sufficiently "red and spe ialist. " Thus , the lack 
1
E t' JC Roll , A History of Economic Thought (New York: Prentice-
Hall , Inc. , 1942), pp. 280-282. 
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of or over-fulfillme nt of plan has a di rect relation to the 
degree of rel ?' ·.<> "dflctrina tion dfo1· s 1 
rh.JJl•»e Cammer <;(Shan· tried (p r _, productivity through us-
tng mod rr" " m. Lt tne J v, use of intensiv •• hbor , indoctrination of people, 
-ul structun•d a nd tnstituhon.Jl changes in the economic sy-
s t m . Duvmg he First Plan. th y could b1 ng a bout an incredible amount 
of "productive ftxed capital. " However , it se:ems , that the Planners were not 
quit a war of the state of mmd of the people 2 Whenever there was an 
overfulfi l ment of a plan. the r e followed an 1 mmediate social reform: for 
mstance , tn i952-1953 (followed by socJahzatJOn of wdustries and collect-
iviza twn of ngnculture), 1955- 1956 (communes in the agricultural sector), 
and 1958 (d c~ ntrali zation a nd thP Grea t. Leap). These years , of course. 
wer acco mpamed by good ha1 ves ts . The degree of indoctrination also 
followe d he pace w1UJ 1\h dJ lhL l.:onomt c d ve lopment took place. 
Chinese P lans 
Th plans m Chtna not only determ i n the allocation of resources 
but a l so the distribution of products , thus I a ding the economy towards 
1 P ete r Schran , ''Economic Pla nning tn Communist China", Asian 
Surve y , II (Dece mber, 1962), 30- 36 . 
2l btd . ' p. 41. 
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socialis m . The plans de tbrmine on the pre se nt consumption , present 
i n estm n~ . and future poss1ble incre ments in both. They also determine 
the qualitie s and quantiti s of th ("commodity mix" ) goods to be produced. 
Upon the decis ion on consumption and investment ratio depends the 
income of the people and the financial plans of the country. The Soviet 
as we ll as the Chinese economic planning e mphasi ze two "laws:" (l) develop-
ment of the socialist economy that would generate a constant growth ; (".~ ) plan-
ned and ba lanced growth. Tha t i s the r a te of consumption should be allowed 
to r i se with th r ise of the na tional income afte r the process of industrial-
i zation has reached a certain s tage . This stage i s not a well defined one. 
Po-I- Po , Chairman of the State Economic Commission of China, 
stated tha t , dur mg 1953- 1.95 6 , the ac cumulation-income ratio moved from 
15.7 per cent in 1952 , 18. 3 in 1953, 21.6 perce nt in 1954, 20.5 in 1955, 
and 22 . 8 pe rcent in 1956. From these figure s , he set normal budget receipts 
to na tional meorne ratio a t about 30 pe r cent , whille that ratio of capital con-
struction to total budge t expe nditure was set at 40 percent. 1 The income -
investme nt r a tio rose dur ing the first plan. As the socialization of the 
econom advanced , it furthe r rose during the Great Leap period. 
1Yuan Li Wu . The Economy of Communist China, p. 5 1. 
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Accordmg to Marx proftt is a surplus va lue and connotes the de-
grt>e of e ploitat ion thus Ll should be rul d out as a criterion for resource 
allocauon . Rece nt ly th1s stand has been modified. Again , the prices of 
produ c~ rs gonds are arbit r a ril y kept high and thos of consumers' goods 
ar kq• t<10 low. The Chin se planners do not want to lower the prices of 
producu ' s goods becaus that would pr " nt the m from obtaining larger 
profits to ena bl large- s cale inv stment. On the other hand , they are 
afraid of r aismg the pnc s of th<.; consumers ' goods for it is likely to 
r e int oduce tht capitahsti trading Ie men! into their society. 
Thus planning autho r i ti s a rE' left with only two controls on re-
s out cP alloca l!on: d1.r ct contro l over la bor and raw mater ia l a llocation, 
and mo1wta ry control. Und r the latter , all purchases and sales have 
to be matchEd agamst authonz d payments and recmpts, with the help of the 
facto r s '>h '< h control productwn. 1 
Th•· blgmnmg of nation-wide pl anning took place in 1951, when the 
State Counell s f inancJal and Economtc ommission announced control 
f1g111 es for production and capital mvestment tn industry and transport and 
dn w up a plan for state-owned industnal cone .rns. The State P lanning 
Comm lttl•t \\c I<' s e t up accordmg to the got·ernment annou ncement by the 
1 ) 'uan- Li Wu . Tht Economy of Communist China , p. 66. 
end of 1952 , so that th First Fiv ea r Plan for development of the 
na tional economy could beg 111 w 1953 . However, the final draft was 
not completed untH February , 1955, and was not made public until 
July of tha t year . 1 Thi s d c la r a tion was w 11-timed, for the Korean 
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War had rom to an nd and the Sovi ts had made their first commitment 
to aid Chin s economic development in early 1953. 
The State Planni ng Committee was renamed the State Planning 
CommiSSion tn 1954 , and in 1956, long t rm a nd short-term planning 
we r sq , · ·, '' T ilE Gtn ll Pla nning Commission prepared the five 
y a r pl ans . and ih State Economic Commission looked after year-to-
year planning . 2 Both of them were placed under the State Council. 
Th pre cise method of planning in China is unknown, but it 
is be lieved that it is a. planning by material balances , probably based 
on te chnkri l co fficients . 3 
1choh-Ming Li , ~conomic Deve lopme nt of Communist China: 
An Appra1sa.l of the First Five egs of Industrialization (Berkeley: 
LJnh· rs!ty of California Press , 1959) , p. 5 . 
2Audrey Donnithorne , "China ' s Economic Planning and Industry" , 
China Quarterly (London) , No. 17 (January-March, 1964) , 112 . 
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Dur ing the First Pla n, there was a shortage of raw materials , 
and s o a General Bureau of Supply of Raw Mate r ials was s et up. For 
the techmcal dEvelopm nt and coordmat ion of plans , the State Technological 
CommissiOn "'~~ <'stah ll s lw cl 1n 1956 1 
Tlw Ch mese C o111;' 1u n1 sts endeavored to bring about a "Socialist 
inclust r 1ah Lat1on" through s uch plans in the future. To them, industrial-
ILa tlon meant "T~1e mars hallmg of a ll efforts and resources for the 
deve lopment of heavy mdustry, as to lay down a foundation for an industrial-
ized s tate and a modermzed nati onal defe nse. "2 Improvement of consumer's 
we lfa r e was le ft to take place as a natural conseque nce of thi s industriali zation. 
The planners expected t'o convcrc the econo my into a socialistic 
one , by the end of three fivtJ year plans. In the meantime about 50 percent of 
the goods needed would be pr oduced at home by the end of the first plan 
and 70 percent by the end of the second pla n. 
Industry , according to the Chine se planners , was composed of 
" mod r n" fac tort s , handicraft fa ctorie s , and individual handicrafts not 
e ngaged in agriculture . Th "modern" component was the one that re-
ce ived the highest priority and its output was to increase from 27 percent 
1Ibid . 
2Li Fu- Ch 'un , "The First Five Year Plan" , quoted by Choh-
MingLi , op. cit . , p. 7. 
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Tall! 9 . Planned targeis and actu a l <> u tputs 
SFYP 
FF\P Official target 
target o utput Sept. Official oureut 
Umt 1957 957 1956 1958 1959 
H e a '0:._!!}Q us tr_y 
Coal MT 113. 0 130.00 190-2 10 270.00 347.80 
rud~ 011 MT 2. 1 1. 46 5-6 2.26 3.68 
E lectr ic pow r bil . kw-hr. 15.90 19. 34 40-43 27.53 41.50 
Steel MT 4. 12 5.35 10.5-12.0 8.00 8. 63 
Ch. f r till zers TT 0. 58 0.63 3.0-3.2 0.81 1. 30 
Metallu r equJ )J . TT .00 30-4- 205.00 
P ow r gene ratmg 
e quipme nt M-kw (1 . 16 0.20 1.4-1. 5 0. 80 2.15 
ement MT 6.00 6. 86 12. 5- 14.5 9.30 12.27 
Light Industry 
Cotton ya rn m . bales 5.00 4. 65 8-9 6.10 8.20 
o tton d o tll bil . m t r·s 5. 58 5.05 7. 25-8. 00 5. 70 7. 50 
Sugar a MT 1. J 0 0.86 2.4-2 .5 0. 90 1. 13 
Machin -mad 
pape r MT . 66 0. 91 1.5-1.6 1. 22 1. 70 
Cr ops 
Food grains MT 181.60 185 .00 250 . 00 250.00 270.00 
Soybeans MT 11. 22 10. 05 12 . 50 10.50 11. 50 
a lnclude d both factory produced and indigenous s ugar . 
TT = thousand tons ; MT = m1 l h on tons; bil. = billion 
Sourc : Choh- Ming Li , "China' s Industrial Development, 1958-1963" China 
Quarter! , No. 17(January-March, 1964), p. 7. 
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of the total gross value product of industry and agriculture in 1952 to 36 percent 
in 1957 . Factory proclur.tion, meaning output of both handicraft and "modern" 
factorie s , is expected to double in value (at constan t prices) at the end 
of each plan. The output of heavy industry would rise from 40 percent of the 
total value of factory production in 1952 to 45 percent in 1957, with a cor-
1 
responding decline of light industry. 
Mechanization of agriculture was to be undertaken over the next 
twenty-five years. The gross value of agricultural products was expected 
to rise about 23 percent in the first five years and 35 percent in the sub-
sequent five years. 
As seen from the Table 1, the high rate of investment that took 
place during the First Pl an (discussed in chapter on Capital Formation); 
brought about fulfillment and, in the case of the heavy industries , almost 
overful fillment of the planned targets . The only exception among the 
heavy indu str ies was the production of the c rude oil. In the light in-
dustrial s<wlu r, machinemade paper was the only industry that over-
fulfill e<l the ta>:<get. A II th<> >:es t fE> Il short of thPir targets. According 
to the offir.ia l figures , the t r gets were me t in the case of food grains, 
while soybean ta rgets were not realized in the Firs t Plan. 
1choi1-\'ling Li. Fcnnomi.c Developmrn• of Communist China , 
91 
After 1954 fue central government treid to control fue whole 
of fue nation's economy, but found it impossible to cope wifu the task. 
Local authorities often failed to comply with fue instructions of the center 
and cracks appeared in the central planning. This ultimately led to fue 
decision to decentralize in 1957-1958, but it was counter-balanced by the 
control of the Party, which insured carrying out fue wishes of the center.1 
Thus, the power to regulate and balance production and allocate labor and raw 
materials was transferred to the local authorities. 
The central government departments were to collect all draft 
plans that were sent by local authorities and allocate materials accord-
ingly to the local authorities. It was the State Economic Commission 
that was to unify , balance, and make a blueprint of fue plans on a national 
scale . 2 A number of conferences of interested parties were called on the 
process of formulation of the plans. Th is new system of decentralized 
planning did not come into operation until 1959. 
Five "A Jl oc', Plnns 
Over the period of T !1~8-1962 there was no such thing as a second 
Five Year Plan; there were instead, five annual ad hoc plans. It started off 
1 Audrey Donnitlwrne , p. 113- 114. 
2 . Ib1d .. p . 115. 
Wi.O a bumper crop and incrcdilJ e gains in UJC industrial production in 
195!!, and ended into a food shortage, industrial dis location, and social 
an · ceonomic confusion. J'he Second Five Year Plan was drafted in 1956 , 
when the Chinese economy was making tremendous progress in the 
industrial bl'<'LOr, with the aid of the Soviet technicians ; and the blessings 
of the good 1mather brought sufficient crops. This plan proposed to raise 
China to 70 percent self-sufficiency in heavy industry and precision 
machines by 962 , and to transofrm her into an advanced industriali.zed 
nation by 1967. 1 
Th~ amount of uasic investment dun ng the Second Five years was to 
double , compared with that uf the First Plan. The s hare of industrial 
sector \va~ expected to rise from 58 . 2 percent to 60 percent. 
Th.; fig res given in Table 1 , arc the proposed targets declared 
offic:~: .. w 1356 for the Second Plan Period. They were again revised 
in cemLe.- 1957. Whatever few revised fi gures are available indicate 
that cx~cpt £;::coal, steel, a nd chemical fertili zers, the figures were 
oca ' uv~~·n. 
1 Choh- Mlng Li. "China's IndustL·ial Development , 1958-1963," 
p . r, 
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This lowering down of the figures for petroleum was explained 
as a realization of the limitations of natural resources . Again, it was 
by the end of 1957, that the planners realized the importance of agri-
cultural development; and so, they proposed r a ising the targets for chemical 
fertilizer a nd rf\ 1' m unJ.Jlements . The investment in agriculture, as 
such, was not raised. Heavy industry, again, was given emphasis. 
The ad hoc plan for 1959 , was appvoved by the State Council 
in April 1959 , but was revised in August. 1959, since the output figures 
of 1958 on which this plan was based we r e gross ly exaggerated. 
During the Great Leap fever, politicians were in command every-
where and the carefully drawn-out targe ts of 1956 were ignored . Statistics 
were reported by the cadres in the field according to their "enthusiasm in 
socialist revolution" rather than on the basis of fact. 1 
By the end of 1959, the quotas set for 1962 (planned September 1956) 
had been a lready fulfilled in 13 of 24 items. This called for a "Supplementary 
Plan for the Las t Three Years of The Second Five Year Plan," which is supposed 
to have been submitted to the People's Congress in March 1960, but has not 
been published . 
Whll during he Great Leap too much e mphasis was put on attain-
ing the targets . A1though the targe ts ·~ r fulfilled during these years, 
~~ .;;. o . 
The Peoples' Daily complained lhallhe full variety of goods planned was 
not realized. 1 Quality , variety , and cost were ignored. 
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A number of specialized bodies were set up in 1958, to inspect the 
quality of goods, and to regulate quarterly the progress of the plans in 
agriculture . industry , capital construction, and distribution of raw mate rials. 
These organs were empowered to reduce prices, suspend delivery, and 
even stop production . But whe n "politics took command," during the Great 
Leap , economic aspec ts of the planning were set aside and the aim of over-
fulfilling the targets took precedence. 
In 1960, when the harvest turned out to be much worse, the move-
ment back to agriculture took momentum. In 196 1 the agricultural output 
declined fu r ther. China was forced to import (wheat, flour , and barley) a 
total of 5.6 m1lhon tons in 1961, 4 . 7 millioHtons in 1962, and about 5.5 
million tons 111 1963 . 2 Th1s was , i11dccd, a big drain on China's economy . 
She had to postpone the imports of her· much needed industrial goods . This 
led to a defimle s hift w the priorities, from 1 cavy industry to agriculture, 
in 1962. 
The Chinese plans were too ambittous from the begi nning . There 
were an overemphasis on industrial production. Laek of accuracy in availa ble 
1 Audrey onnit' :urnc, p. 120. 
2 Choh-l\lh~g r , ~. p. H'. 
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statistical data made it imposs ible to formulate the plans precisely. Dur-
ing the first plan , the administrative organs failed to supervise the work-
ing of this system owing to its vastness, but as a result of decentralization 
of 1957-1958 , the little control the planners had was lost. As a consequence, 
planning became impossible after the Great Leap. There have been no plans 
published since 1960. 
Lack of co-orclination between the planning and the statistical 
departments is evident from the planned increase in e mployment of non-
agricultural wage-earners by 840,000 pe rsons , while the actual increase 
was 2. 3 million. This may be compared with estimates of 25 million employed 
non-agricultural workers and 143 million employed agricultural workers . 
The resultant increase of wage bill by 2. 7 billion yuan exceeded the planned 
1. 78 billion increase. 1 
There has been overemphasis on fulfilling the targets at the cost 
of quality of goods. Industrial priority overlooked the principle of com-
parative cost . Often wages were not paid in terms of yuans and so , the 
opportunity cost was not a pparent. 
There see ms to be a number of illegal practices-unauthorized 
purchase-orders and invoices, purchase and sale of raw materials on the 
1Yuan- Li Wu , Economv of Communist China . p . 69 . 
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black market , and production in "underground factories. ,l A campaign 
was started against these ' 'deviations" in 1963. 
These trends in the Chinese economy indicate that, although the 
planners have been able to r a ise investment rates to a new height and the 
. ,,c has success fully been increased, the r esource allocation 
has not been made efficiently. It has resulted in a greater economic waste 
than would have been the case under an economy open to international 
trade and price mechanism. 
At a conference on Employment and Economic Development, held 
a t Geneva , 
The socialist economists frankly admitted serious 
pla.nning errors, for instance, in allocation of 
investments between sectors, in institutional 
arrangements of co llcctivisation, in the choices 
of techniques in large -scale industries a nd so on . 
They did confess that planning should not alto-
gethe r neglect the laws of supply and demand, also 
tha t the concept of stages of development with con-
sequences as to appropr iate choices of techniques 
etc .. should 0e applied. While the sole dependence 
of market system for planning was not satisfactory 
to the western economists either . This is where 
University of Califo rnia's Professor Leibenstein 
a nd Dr. Svenjar of Prague agreed. But, of course, 
the handling of mixed sys tem is also not easy. 2 
1Ibid., p. 71. 
2Mohamma<l Sndi ·w0rk Vet(;l•S Gl o" i h , ., Far Eastern Economic 
Q({ ·~ ll. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CHINA IN THE INTERN/\ rl ' lN 1\L ECONOMY 
It is an accepted fact tha t through international trade both trading 
partners find economic benefit. Through interna tional trade , a nation can raise 
the s tandard of living within a re latively short time .1 China is trying to make 
the use of fo re ign trade for her economic needs, but the Communist methods 
0f ro::owing econom ic growth by means of artifically closed evonomy does not 
a llow hP.r to reap all the benefits of the inte rnational trade. 
Communist Theory of Fot•t·tgn Trade 
Marx, Engels, and Lenin discussed poli tical aspects of trade , but 
did not contribute to the economic aspects of international trade . In the 
Soviet bloc, the e mphais is laid on the planning a nd operational problems 
of foreign trade , as to what goods to impor t or export and what prices to 
chaqre . 
The Communist th rory of internati onal economic relations is 
quite different from tha t of the Open and f' r<'" Countries of the world . 
1s eymour E. Harris, Interna tw ns. • ., ,.Li ~nterregional E conomics 
(New York: McGraw-1~m Bonk Conll''""V Tno ·. 1 '1~ 7 . . 288. 
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Foreign lr~rl " is a monopoly' f •11 "" t.c, whit'h acts as a buffer between domest 
domestic and foreign markets. Foreign prices have little effect on domestic 
prices . 
1 
Owing to peculiar price-setting procedures, domestic prices do not 
reflect domestic costs of production (average or marginal). Due to the nature 
of banking system, exchange rates have little influence on domestic pro-
duction . 2 
A further complication was created by Marxist pricing theory 
and the separation of "use value" (a measure of utility) and " production 
(labor) valuc" (cost of production). "Use value" was considered the 
determining factor of foreign trade. The "URe-values"-production and 
consumption goods -had to be imported to satisfy the demands or the 
needs of planned development . "Production va lue" must be considered 
in foreign trade, for profitable trade. 
This resulted in a further development of (a) 
two types of profitabilities, (i) normal 
profitability of tradem arising out of savings 
in cost of production through trade , and (ii) 
"total use" of trade, which considers not 
only production costs but also of demand factors 
("usc value")- (b) Profitability of exports is 
approached from the cost side ("production 
value" side) , while that of imports from the 
"use-value" side. 111is asynometry has further 
created some diffi<'<Jlt problems. 3 
1Frederic L. Pryor, "Foreign Trarle Titeory in the Communist 
Bloc", The Soviet Studies, XIV (July, 1962), 42. 
3 Ibid. , p. 44 . 
Domestic prices are rlistorted by the inclusion of turnover 
taxes, excise taxes , anrl ><o on, which are adder! at every production 
step. Thus, it cannot be compared with world prices. This makes 
the applica tinn of the principle of opportunity cost impossible. 
The Bloc foreign trade economists take it for granted that 
foreign demand elasticities are infinite for a ll their exports and 
supply e lasticities are infinite for their imports . 1 The use of the 
· nputs - utput technique has seldom been discu~:>scd in rela lwn to 
profitabili y coPfficients. 
A very heavy emphais laid on the labor theory of value i s a 
further impediment created in pricing intra- block goods , for the 
factors of production are immobile . 2 Thus, intra-bloc price-systems 
have been unsatisfactory. 
I~ these conceptual diffi culties Rnd differing me thods of cal-
culation i n C'>mmunist countries further impeder! economi c growth 
thro gh int<>rnational tr~ de. 
'Ibid . , p . 8. 
2Ibid ., Ci5 . 
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Ch 1 nese l'radc Po l i e ics 
Chinese trade practice s r eflect prE-cisely the same bloc theory of 
i nter na.tiono l trade . In 1952 the former Ministry of Trade was split into two: 
he Min' <t' ,f International Comm<'rce a nd the Ministry of Foreign Trade. 
ThP go·:cr nmr n• could val ida te or' ,IJwcl 1111\ l!uh vHiual export or import 
transation and determine the price at whJeh 3ny purchase or sale was 
made . 
c., tcad<> has always been an integral and an important component 
The- , ,por ts of the country are determined by the need to 
impor t. International price comparisons, wherever possible, are often 
over looked i the interest of political motives. Again, exchange rates 
are not determined by the interplay of demand and supply on the free market. 
Inte nal price , do not r e fl ct the cost of production, and so the comparative 
cost pnncipt<> becomes r edundant . Since self-sufficiency and a high rate 
of ecOJ.omic u·:>elopment are the goals, the imports must , in the usual 
.our"e ~f i n;c , be c.:.~;r; ed of capital goods and industrial raw materials . 
In 195G, the Com munist b ~ "c. provided a fif tlt of China's imports and imported 
iesi' than '1 thir d of China' s exports . By 1952 Ute bloc took about three-fourth 
of al China 's exports and provided her "ith two-thirds of her imports. 1 
1Pauline win. '<_he Foreign Tr·adP 'Jf C~mmun.ist China: Its Im-
.l!.!~S~ OP ~-~'Jr .. • l ~ ~·~t· . '- 1rir · / 1 , ;..)rat-~..;1- . 1 g64} P~ 31. 
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A Coordinating Committee (CONCOM) had been set up in Paris In 1949, 
on a voluntary basis, to control the strategic exports to the East European 
Soviet Bloc. The pendulum of Chinese foreign trade suddenly moved to-
wards the Soviet Bloc, as soon as the United Nations recommended in 1956 
an embargo against Red China. The CONCOM was then entrusted with 
the duties of regulating Chinese trade . 1 
In 1951, China decided to expand her trade with the bloc and the 
non-aligned countries, and continue trading with the CONCOM nations 
as far as the embargo permitted. 2 Her trade with the bloc increased 
tremendously until the Sino-Soviet split of 1960 that resulted in an open 
denunciation of each other. The pendulum, once more, took a swing 
toward the western countries. 
Sov iet Aiel 
As mentioned before, Russia was the biggest ally of China, and 
the .:hl':. t t':· c Year l'l1n of China was mo re than successful because of 
the assi~tance rende r('<! by Russia. 
1coNCOM Countries are; ·n1e United States, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands , Norway, 
PorLgz., Turk<y , th< Jnitcd Kingdom, t'ram:e and West Germany. 
;! . Op. (a t. , p. 32. 
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Sino-Soviet economic relations can be divided into two phases: 
The Era of Co-operation, that lasted for ten years, from 1949 to 1959, and the 
Era of Conflict , that began sometime in the end of 1959 and the beginning 
of 1960 , and still persists . The impact of these two politically-oriented 
phases have a very far - reaching impact on their economic relations . 
Communist China is the only underdeveloped country in the 
world that has received an insignificant amount of financial assistance 
from external sources. Although the aid was very limited in terms of 
quantity, it was very timely and very effective. Soviet Russia was 
,;1::; vuly '' traternal" country that had lent a helping hand to China prior 
to 1960. 
f ' If :wu loans '"Cl"C g ranted to China. The first being the Sino-
Soviet Agreement of Frebruary 14, 1950, providing for a loan of $300 
million-$60 million per year from January 1950 to the end of 1954, at 
an interest rate of 1 percent per annum. 1 The amount was to be spent 
on imports of industrial goods from the U. S. S. R. China agreed to 
repay the sum by 1964. 2 Under the first loan agreement, China was to 
implement. with Soviet assistance, 141 industrial projects during 1950-1959. 
1Ibid. 
2E. F . Szezepanik, "Foreign Trade of Mainland China , " Con-
te l'Oorary China . fiT (19?fl i. P. 70 
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Some 50 to 70 percent of the mam equipme nt was to be supplied by the 
Soviet Union. 1 
The second loan was a nnounced on October 12 , 1954 , and provided 
for a. long-te•· m credi t of 52 0 m illion rubles, or $ 130 million . 2 China was 
to under tak" 15 additional e nterprises, wllh supplies of equipment a mount-
ing to $100 million. 3 
According to Prof ssor Choh-Ming Li , the financing of the so-
called Sov•ct-aid projects i.Jy Russia has been only 30 . 5 percent of the total 
cos t 4 'he total cos t of the oviet-aid proJects came to 5 , 140 million 
yuan. Of this total , 4 , 060 million went into building 50 of the 141 projects 
agreed upon, and 880 mi llion went into the 15 enterprises agreed on in 1954. 
The remaining 200 mi llion were spent on the two projects out of 55 arranged 
in 1956. 5 According to Choh-Ming Li , out of Ute total aid of 3, 120 million 
yuan only 1, 570 million were utili zed in financing the Sovie t-aid projects, 
whi ch amount~d to 30 percent of the project cost of 5, 140 million . On the 
l;bid .• p . 84. 
2Feng-Hwa Mah , p . 35. 
3Far Eastern Economic Review, ·n (May 12 , 1955) 603. 
4 c hoh-Ming Li , Economic Development of Communist China: An 
Appra1sal o f the First Five Years of Industualization (Berke ley: University 
r Colifo•·nia Press, 1959), p 174. 
5Ibid . 
104 
Table 10. Estimate of annual Sovie t-loans to Communist China by uses, 
1953-1957a 
Econ. loan 
as percent 
of state 
Economic loans Milita ry loa ns Total loans capital 
Yuan u. s. $ Yuan U. S. $ Yuan u.s. $ investment 
1953 140. 7 60 297.8 127 438 187 2. 2. 
1954 140.7 60 743.4 317 884 377 1.9 
1955 304 . B 130 1,353 5 77 1,657 707 3.7 
1956 117. 4 50 0 0 117 50 0.8 
1957 23. 3 10 0 0 23 10 0.2 
Total 726.9 310 2,394.2 1,021 3, 120 1 , 331 1.5 
a Official exchange rate: U. S. $ = 2. 345 Yuan . Unit: 1 Million. 
Source: Feng-Hwa Mah , "The Financing of Public Investment in 
Communist China, " The Journal of Asian Studies, XXI(November, 
1961), p . 36 . 
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other hand , Feng-Hwa Mah conte nds that only 726.9 million yuan were 
extended in the economic aid , while 2, 394.2 million yuan were given in 
military aid over the same period of the First Plan. 1 
The Soviet economic aid had contributed only l. 5 percent of the 
state capital investment from 1953 to 1957. The total Soviet economic 
aid of 727 mi 11 ion yuan amounted to only 0. 53 percent of the total budget 
revenue of this period. 2 According to Professor Choh-Ming Li, the aid 
contributed (1. 57) billion yuan) 3 percent of the total state investment 
(49. 3 billion yuan) , over the First Plan. 3 
Besides these economic loans , Russian technical assistance and 
her trade have been of enormous aid to Chinese economic development. It 
is reported that, 
More than 10 , 000 Soviet specialists were sent 
to the People ' s Republic of China for varying terms 
be tween 1950 and 1960 . Some 10,000 Chinese engineers, 
technicians and skilled workers, and about 1000 scientists 
were taught and trained in the U.S.S. R. between 1951 
and 1962. More than 11,000 students and post-graduate 
students graduated from Soviet higher educational 
establishments in this period. 4 
1Feng- Hwa Mah , p . 36 . 
2Ibid. 
3choh- Ming Li , "Economic Developme nt, 11 The China Quarterly, 
No. 1 (J·anuary - March , 1960), 38. 
4naniel Wolfs ton, "E cononncs of the Split, 11 Far Eastern Economic 
Review , XXXIDI (May 28, 1964) 422. 
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Other Communist countries ha ve sent more than 1 , 500 experts to 
China. 1 
Dunng the period 1954-1959, the U. S.S.R. had provided such te 
technical mformation, as, 1, 169 sets of technical data on industrial con-
struction; 3, 704 sets of blueprints of machinery and equipment; and 1, 018 
items of other information on industrial and mining aspects, all without 
payments . 2 It was this technical information that enabled China to ful-
fill her First Five Year Plan . Soviet sources have declared that , 
Of China's total output in 1960, the enterprises 
built with Soviet technical aid accounts for 51 per-
cent of the rolled stocks , about 85 percent of trucks 
and tractors, 40 percent of the e lectrical power, 
55 percent of the st am and hydrolic turbines, 19 
percent of the aluminium, 70 percent of the tin, 
100 percent of the synthetic rub her , etc. 3 
Li Fu-Ch'un , the Planning Chief of China, also 
stated that, the Soviet selected "The latest technical 
achieve ments" and gave China "first class and most 
adva nced equipment. tt4 
1Feng-Hwa Mah , op. cit., p. 37 . 
2Ibid. 
3
"Soviet Economic and Technical Aid to China: Facts and Figures", 
Soviet Docume nts , IT (October 12, 1964), 18. 
4 alvin Suey Keu Chin , A Study of Chinese Dependence Upon Soviet 
L:nwn For Economic Dev l opment· As A Factor In Communist China's Foreign 
Policy (HongKong: 'lnion Res <~.r h Tnstiiutt> , 1959) , p. 73. 
Table 11. Sino-Soviet trade, 1950-1961 
Million rubbles a 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962b 
Soviet 
exports 350 431 499 628 684 674 660 490 571 859 735 331 210 
Soviet 
imports 172 298 373 428 521 579 688 664 793 990 763 496 464 
Balance 178 133 126 200 163 94 -2 8 -174 -223 -131 -28 -166 -254 
aValues for all years are shown in " ne w" foreign trade rubles, introduced January 1, 1961. Conversion at the 
bofficial exchange rate, $1.00 equals 0. 90 rubles, will provide reasonable approximations of dollar val ues. 
Far Eastern Economic Review, XXXXill (September 19, 1963), p . 723. 
Minus sign denotes Soviet import surplus. Minor discrepancies between balance shown and difference of items 
are due to rounding. 
Source: 1950-1954: Voneshniaia Torgovlia, No. 10(1959), p. 288 ; 1955-1959: Voneshniaia Torgolvia USSR za 
1955-1959 gody (Moscow , 1961); 1960-1961: Voneshniaia Torgovlia USSR za gody (Moscow, 1962). 
Oleg Hoeffeding, "Sino-Soviet Economic Relations-1959-1962," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science. CCCIL (September 1963), p. 103. 
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These figures illustrate the enormous extent to which the 
So iet L' nion played its par t in Chinese economic development in the 
years of !hell' coopera ti n. Although tho amount of capital loaned by Russia 
was small , tlw tm·cstme nt mcJcl o wns vc l' y effective . Nevertheless, the 
above figtn c~ .. , fl e et the state of underdeve lopment that China was in, 
prior to the l1 r s t Plan. 
The Era of Confli ct 
The Chinese economic calamities coincided with the Sino-
Soviet rift . Moreover, her industrialization d·rive received a severe 
blo w, as she could not obtain sufficient long-term loans from the 
Communist Bloc tlor from the West . In summer of 1960 , 1, 300 highly-skilled 
Soviet spe ialists were recalled. 1 This gave the Chinese economy a paralytic 
stroke. 
By .J uly 1960 , at the ti me of the withdrawal , at least 137 of the 
291 projec t~ rpmained uncomple ted . The departure of the Soviet experts, 
togeth•·~ wi tr blueprints. and the drastic reduction in the supply of complete 
sets of e uipment and key engineering items, put not only these uncompleted 
project ~ out Pi operation . but other related pr ojects as well. According to 
Po-I -Po , 300 pro'ects covering a wid!' ra nge of industries and spreading 
1
"Pc king- MosC'ow: Major Pronoun emc nt!' , " China News Analvsis , 
No . 479 (August 2, 1963), p. 5 
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throughout the country came to an abrupt halt as a result of the Soviet 
withdrawal. 1 
Sino-Sovicc i'nt 'c 
Prior to 1959 Communist Chinese trade showed a very high degree 
of dependence upon the Soviet Russia . But the period following 1959 is 
characterized by independence from the U. S. S. R. and diversification of 
trade relations among the non-Bloc countries . 
Because of the lack of availability of data from the Chinese official 
sources, one must have recourse to secondary data which may hot be accurate 
but may throw a light in that direction. Again, during this period the fre-
quent fluctuations in the exchange rates have made it difficult to arrive at 
the actual change m Chinese trade , in terms of other currencies. 
Since the extension of the first Soviet loan of $300 million in 1950, 
China signed trade agreements each year . She demanded industrial equip-
ment , wtercommunicahon instruments, mining instruments, chemical 
plants and cereals. For r eturn, she exported silk textiles, tea , wool, 
non-ferrous metals , vegetable oils. cotton textile s, and rice. 
i Hontlld ·t;. sia, ·Economic Chang<1S ; "1 Communist China". 
T hf' J>OHl;2~'!~I'l~£!L XX • . Uu~' -&>" <<'n•''"'. ;;it>'± , . 1•9 . 
Table 12 . Sino-Russian 1960-19€2 tradea 
1960 1961 1962 
Chinese Im ports 
Complete plant 336. 5 71. 0 8.0 
Othe r m aclnn l' ry and equi pme nt 117. 0 26. 3 16.6 
Petrole um products 90.9 108.6 72.5 
Stee l produ< t>- 33. 4 16.6 15.0 
Cer ealsb 15.8 18.7 
Others 157.6 92.3 79.3 
Total 735.4 330.6 210. 1 
Chine se Ex)22r ts 
Metals ores, cone. 55 . 1 43 . 5 31. 8 
Metals and alloys 55. 5 38.5 29.3 
Oil s eeds , e tc. 38 . 8 1.1 
Rice 49 .7 0.3 18.4 
Tesc hles 125.6 113.7 106 . 5 
Clothing 172.8 157. 7 163.0 
Others ~ o 5 . tl 141. 5 115. 7 
To tal 763 .3 464.7 
:l<ew rubJts in million . 1 N. R. equal s U. S. $l. 1 
Rye, \\ lotH ! and fiour , cotton , wool , silk-excluding clothing. 
Source: Fo.r Eas tern Economic Re view,XXXXIII(September 19, 1963) , 
p. 723. 
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Under the protocols signed in February and December 1955 , 
the U.S.S.R. promised to de liver machine tools , building machinery, 
road-building equipment and other things. China, in exchange, agreed 
to export Jute , wool , silk and vegetable oils . 
A ceording to Chinese official sources , 10 of the Soviet-aided 
industrial prljects had been completed by 1954. 1 These included a 
heavy steel-rolling mill , a seamless steel-tubing mill, the sheet-steel 
mill of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company, and the Haichow open cut 
mine at Fushin. In February 1955, the Soviet "gift machinery" 
to the Friendship State Farm in Hailwong Kiang was reported to 
consist of 98 tractors, 100 harvestors, 128 tractor ploughs, and 120 
tractor drawn grain planters . 2 
The decrease in China's foreign trade in 1956 and 1957, could 
be explained in terms of political turmoil that took place in the Soviet 
Bloc that yt:a r . The Hungarian revolt and the Polish crisis, together 
with Russia' s repre ssive action in these countries, had an adverse 
effect on the Bloc ' s trade. Russian loans were a lso reduced during this 
period, causing Sino-Sovi('.t t rade to decline further. 3 China's trade 
1 E. F . Szczepanik , "Foreign Trade of Mainland China," Con-
tempora n Clu na , 1958- 1959 . In (19&v, 
z_@~..: 
JRoberi F . Dernberge r (ed. C. F. Remer), Three Essays on 
International Economics of Communist China (Ann Arbor: University of 
with the Free World leaped upwa rds. Another reason for the drop in 
China's tota l trade in 1956- 1957 was that it was deliberately p lanned 
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to be r.:duC"cd by 8. 4 percent , for the Chinese Planners thought that 
Ineroascd fo1 <'Jgn trade increased the burden of payme nt on the economy. 
Thr·n arrived the per iod of China's a mbitious Great Leap For-
ward. and Sino-Soviet trade boomed once again . TheSoviet Union dur-
ing this period wholehr•;ll t<'dly s upported Ch1 nese aims and laid before 
them <'xperu:Hv• technica l . ma terial , and human resources. 
Accord111g to Chinese reports. during the first months of 1958 
the Soviet Union supp lied China with complete sets of up-to-date equip-
ment for more than 20 large motnllurgi oa l , machine building , power, 
and coal e ntt>rpr1ses. In nddition l.o this , the U.S.S.R. increased her 
eJo.1JOrts o f industrial goods and equipment in 1958 by four-fold over that 
of 1957. SI11• c1 lso supplied 8, 000 trucks , 2 , 000 trailers , more than half 
a million tons of petroleum , locomotives , and ra ils . 2 In return China 
supplwd sovbeans. r1ce edible oils and fa ts , minerals , meat , poultry , 
eggs, tea , fr ui ts , hemp . tobacco, a nd li ght indu s trial products. This 
indi cates a gradual changl• on th P si de of Chinese exports fr om consist-
ing entire ly of raw agricultural items to commercial cash crops, meat, 
a nd light industria l goods . 
1IbJd. p 134 . 
2Jbid. p. 111 . 
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The Sino-Soviet agre me nt on the further extension of economic 
co-orwranon was Signed in Moscow on February 7, 1959. Under the 
agreem nl the coun!rtes und rtook to cooperatively construct 78 large 
pla nts m th< following mdustries : metallurgy, building materials , 
chemica l coal , oli , machine building , radio equipment and power 
generators . To tal value of these activities was estimated at $1.250 
billion . 1 
In the· years ol the Great Leap (1958 and 1959) China's imports 
from Russia rose by 75 perc nt. and her exports by 49 percent. Both 
expor ts a· w 11 as imports reached their highest watermark in 1959. 
The Sino- Soviet trade accountce for approximate ly half of China's 
total trade . The trade expansion was the direct result of the urgent 
de ma nds for capita l equipe mnts a nd raw ma terials , generated by the 
Great Lea p . The "completed ~e t. s of equipme nt" reached a peak in 
1959 , account1ng for 42 perce nt of total exports to China . 2 
Had It not been for Soviet Russia's cooperation, China could 
never have been a ble to imple ment a "Leap" in the face of foreign 
1 
Szczepanik ~·, p. 111. 
2 Olr~?: Hoeffend1ng , " Sino- Sovie t Economic Relations 1959-
1962'. Tht Annals of th America n Acad my of Political and Social 
1963) , 94 - 106. 
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exchange shortages, the United States' embargo , and the Western 
reluctance to trade with Chma. 
Chtnese exports in 1959 showed an increase in dairy products and 
rice, but the most conspicuous increase was in textiles and clothing. The 
latte r may have a direct re lation tofue suspension of shipments of cotton 
to the West. 1 
The protocol signed in February 1959, covering the period 
1959-1967 , was to assure China of Soviet Russia's forthcoming assistance 
in her future economic deve lopment and implied the "progressive inte-
gration of the Chinese e conomy into that of the Communist Bloc . 2 
It is a matter of speculation when one tries to gauge the mo"tives 
o( Russ1 a u1 refusing to extend auy cred its to China dur ing the per iod of 
vigorous tr·ad . On the contrary, she demanded repayments by raising 
Chinese exports . It might be tha t they had already paid out la rge sums 
in loans to the Chinese (the latest agreement signed in 1959 was for 5 . 0 
biillon t' ubl es), and they may have felt worried about repayment. 3 
1A. Boon, "Tbe Foreign Trade of Chi na," The China Quarterly, 
No. 11 (July-September , 1962) , 181. 
2
Jean Polaris , "The Sino-Sovie t Dispute" , International Affairs, 
XXX(Octobe r , 1964) , 649 . 
3
•· Hard Bargaming" The Economist , CCIX (Apri l 15, 196 1) , 
209 . 
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In any event , China, the only and the largest underdeveloped 
country in the world , was thus rendered without any kind of external 
economic assistance from a ny source. At the same time, from 1958 on, 
Mongolia , North Vietnam, and North Korea was treated to a bounty of 
Soviet economic development assistance , which , when compared on 
a per capita basis, far exceeded anything that China had received from 
Russians . 1 
Nevertheless, Sino-Soviet cooperation has benefited the 
Chinese to an enormous extent. Accoeding to Mr. M. A. Shushlov's 
report in the April 3, 1964 issue of J>ravda , Sovie t Union had built 
more than 200 large industrial enterprises, shops, and other projects 
equipped with modern machinery. The Soviet-assisted factories enabled 
China to produce annually 8, 700,000 tons of iron, 8,4 00 , 000 tons of 
steel, and 32 , 300 , 000 tons of coal and shale , 70 percent of China's 
tin outpu t , 100 percent of its synthetic rubber output , 25 to 30 percent 
of its electric output, and 80 percent of the carriers and tractors 
produced annually. The Soviet-aided defense plants were the core of 
Chinese defense industry. 2 
1Hoffending, QP.,_ cit . , p . 104. 
2Wolfstone , op . cit . , p. 421. 
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The Era of Sino-Soviet Conflict 
Sino-Soviet economic and political relations took a dramatic 
turn in recent years . 
According to the figures given in Table , it is clear that 
the Sino-Soviet trade reached its zenith in 1959 . Afterwards, it con-
sistently declines, both in exports and in imports. China had incurred 
a huge debt in her trade dealings with Russia. Since then, she has been 
making a deliberate effort to create a surplus in her Soviet trade accounts. 
The decline in Russian trade has further reduced China's ability tore-
pay the deficit . The withdrawal of the Soviet technical specialists 
coincided with Chinese agricultural disasters. Lack of sufficient 
loans from the bloc as well as from the West s lowed down her in-
dustrialization drive. 
At least 137 of the 291 Soviet-aided projects remained un-
completed at the time of the withdrawal of the Soviet aid in July 1960. 
As a result, Chinese total trade receded to about the 1958 level and 
there was a lso a reversi on to tho 1958 orientation. The bloc trade 
declined by 15 percent and was balanced, and the trade with the non-
Communist world rose by 10 percent, which enabled China to earn a 
surplus in transferable curre ncy. 1 
1A. Boon, "The Foreign Trade in China," The China Quarterly, 
No. 11 (July-September, 1962) , 181. 
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In 1961, it was declared that China could not execute the agreed 
volume. As a result , there was a deficit of approximately $320 million 
(288 million new rubles) . In 1962, owing to continued bad agricultural 
yields , Chin~ had to buy cereals from other countries and curtail her 
exports of toods tuffs . As a result her total trade also declined . In 
the same yeat>. 1961 , Marshal Chen, referring to Sino-Soviet relations 
in Geneva, stated, "China is too big to be anybody's satellite. n1 
In 1960 , China' s imports from the U. S.S. R. still accounted for 
50 percent of her total imports, but in 1961 and 1962 the proportion fell 
to 30 percent a nd 25 percent , respectively. 2 This was a direct con-
sequence of the Soviet decis ion to drop her aid to China. Over and above 
the commerical debt, however , the Soviet government also exacted 
repayment of the Korean War loan. 3 This added to the strain that the 
Cl il'eRe economy was already undergoing because of the economic dis-
aste rs tha t preceeded this period. 
lie can observe from the Table , on the Sino- Soviet trade, 
trat in l.(J6L-1!162 :~~per;.!' fro m China dwindled by about 500 million 
new rubtes. while expor s fe ll about 300 million. In a communique 
J "Pe!ung Duck Egg," The Eco'1omist, CC (July 8, 1961) 120. 
2Polaris, op. Clt. , p. 647 . 
0 
J· 0::.~" Roi;! n:::':" ..., · h~nP.fe Comn1 n ...-~ 11 I~ Poiitica~uarterly , 
XXY.. ... ., Hl l y-Sep\.e mt;t 1~, -! ti~ . ~ .. -~ _ 
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on the trade talks held in 1963 in Moscow, it was stated that the 
Chinese would he used to pay off part of the debt payable in 1965. 1 
Since the Chinese are badly in need of foreign exchange to buy industrial 
equipment from the West , it has been typical of the Chinese to build 
up a trade surplus with their trading partners. It is quite evident from 
the trade figures given in items (Table ) , that China has built 
up this surplus by slashing down the imports of capital goods from 
the U.S.S. R. Thus , she turns to the West for her industrial goods. 
Sino-Soviet trade fell by 37 percent in 1962 over that of 1961, 
while in absolute terms, Russian exports totalled 210 million new rubles 
compared to 496 , respectively. 2 Total industrial equipment imports 
fell to 25 million rubles from its 1961 level of 97 million. Oil, an 
important import, had fallen by 25 percent , probably because China 
had found a friend in Albania- a new oil-country. 
While her exports rose to one-fifth , from her earlier position 
of being one-seventh in 1960 , China's food products had found their 
way to Russia in much smaller quantities in 1962; for she herself 
had to import grains from abroad. China had a lso cut down her imports 
1
colina MacDougall , "Russian Trade Down" Far Eastern 
.Economic Review, XXXXI (September 26 , 1963) , 802- 803 . 
2TI?_!d 
of petroleum and steel. The imports of complete plants also declined 
more or less into insignificance . At the same time, China has been 
buying wheat from other countries and selling rice which is more 
expensive , thus gaining the benefit of the trade. Her textile products 
have also lound markets abroad. Nevertheless, it appears that the 
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Suviet U ion did not deliberate ly cut her exports to China since the quarrel, 
but she had undoubtedly adopted a purely commercial policy toward 
China - "cash on the barrelhead . " It was China who cut down on 
imports in order to pay for her debts and to spread out her trade 
relations, while not keeping all the eggs in the same basket. 
The Soviet Union supplied no grains to China, while ex-
porting 6. 8 million tons of grains in 1960 and 7. 5 mi llion in 1961 
to other countries. At the s a me time China had to purchase grains 
worth $300 million of hard-earned foreign exchange from the West. 
"While acknowledging China's food difficulties , 500,000 tons of 
Cuba sugar due to Russia was to be delivered to China in 1961, 
as an ' interest free loan' repayable in 1964-1967. " 1 The U.S.S.R. 
a lso sold 300, 000 tons of wheat , rye, and flour to China and ex-
poT:z::!. mdlw n tons to other countries . China decided to buy six 
million tor.. of cer als from non-bloc countries. 
According to the Sino-Sovie t trade agreement, concluded in 
Peking on April 20, 1962, "Russia is to take Chinese ores and send 
back rolled metals , oil and chemicals, lorries and machinery." 
In 1962, Ru Rsian exports to China totalled 210 million new rubles, 
compared with 330 in 1961 and 735 in 1960 . It was a fall of 37 percent 
trade in 1961. Nevertheless, Chinese exports have fallen only from 
496 million in 1961 to 464 million in 1962, despite Chinese agri-
cultural disasters. This indicates as to the frantic zeal with which 
Chinese are wanting to repay their obligations to the "fraternal 
country" prier •o the date agreed upon and then follow her own paths. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TRADE WITH "FRATERNAL COUNTRIES" 
As seen from the Table , on China's trade with other 
Communist countries, the statistics are often not available , except 
for that of Poland. Until 1956, trade was conducted on the basis of 
annual trade. But in 1956 East Germany and Czechoslovakia entered 
into a long term (1957-1962) agreement to supply plants and equipment 
for Chinese Second Five Year Plan. In 1958 and 1959 all the rest of 
the East European countries signed agreements up to 1962, except 
Rumania . 1 
Soviet Russia wanted to integrate the Chinese economy into 
the Socialist bloc ' s planned development programs, by making her a 
member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) . 
This woula enable th.e Russians to coordinate each other's plans, and 
yield tl .e advantages of the division of labor within the Socialist camp. 
But the Chinese would not accept Soviet supremacy in the COMECON , 
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Table 13. China's trade with East-European Communist countries, 
1953-1957a 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 Total 
BULGARIA 
Exports 18.2 17.1 20. 6 
Imports 21. 2 18.2 20.6 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
E xports 256 .6 267.8 
Imports 258.9 320. 6 
EAST GERMANY 
Exports 212. 1 269.5 376.6 343.6 354.2 1 ,556.0 
Imports 241. 5 398.0 389.6 379.7 423.0 1, 831. 8 
HUNGARY 
Exports 134. 3 116. 1 111.6 110.7 
Imports 118.2 146 . 1 123 . 8 119.0 
POLAND 
Expor ts 109 . 0 118 . 0 141. 0 141.0 149.0 658.0 
Imports 124 . 0 148.0 139 . 0 201. 0 179 . 0 791. 0 
EAST EUROPEtN 
Total trade 360 425 455 467 490 2,200 
Balance ot trade b - 25 -40 
: Rubles in miihon 
in U. S. $million 
N te : The tab does not include Albania, R umania, and Yugos l avia. Thus , 
in total for 1957 can be esti ma ted at about U. S. $500 million . 
Source : ContemQorar y China, III ( 1960), p. 89. Data based on Vneshnia 
torgovl ia, Moscow, October 1958. 
and so refused to join it . Nevertheless, it is quite interesting to note 
that China's trade relations within the Communist Bloc have been 
having a direct bearing on her relations with Russia. During the 
period of Sino-Soviet cooperation (1949 -1959) China's trade with 
satelli te countries reached its climax. No sooner had the Sino-
Soviet quarrel reached its heights at the Bucharest Communist 
Conference than there resulted the tearing up of Sino-Soviet trade 
contracts and withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China. There 
followed a deterioration in China's economic relations with the 
East European satellite countries. 
Of course, the European Communist countries had not shovm 
much enthusiasm in trading "~th China, since her exports consisted 
of low quality raw materials . With the exception of Albania, they have 
all been pro-Russian in their economic and political approach to their 
problems. China found Albania as her only ally in the Balkans . Un-
fortunate ly for her , Albania is the most underdeveloped agricultural 
country of the bloc, and s o her economy is not quite complementary 
to that of China to establish compatible trading relations. On the 
contrary , China has to pour aid into Albania which strains her econ-
omy. Jn return China gets Albania's political support. 
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Survey of Bloc Trade 
Albania . Sin_o-Aibanian trade did not develop before 1956 . It 
was in the same year that very important oil wells were discovered 
which gave a hope to Albania's oil indus try, to quadruple production by 
1960. 1 While Russia herself produced a huge bulk of oil and the 
satellite countries entirely depended on Russia, her prospects of ex-
porting oil to th bloc were remote. China was the only prospective 
buyer They exchanged oil , copper, chro me ores for steel , rubber, 
industrial raw materials and textiles from China. 2 Albania expected 
to export around 2 million metric tons of oil annually. 3 111ltS , China 
was fairly successful in replaci ng Russia as her source of oil. 
ln 1959, Sino-A lbanian trade amounted to 2 . 7 percent of 
Albania's total foreign trade, while Russo-Albanian trade was 5 0 
percent of 1l. 4 While i n 1961 , Sino-Albanian trade was 28. 2 percent. 
By 1962 . the year touching the he ight of Sino-Soviet schism and the 
lnanie l Tretiak, "The Founding of the Sino-Albanian Entente , " 
The China Quarterly , No . 10 (April-J'une, 1962) , 131. 
2szczepanik , "Foreign Trade of Mainland China", Comtemporary 
China , 1958- 1959, III (1960). 112. 
3n aniel Tre tiak , "China' s Eu ropean Ally" , Far Eastern 
Economic Review, XXX (May 16 , 1963), 370. 
4Lewin, op. cit. , p. 51. 
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first year of Russian open economic boycott against the Adriatic rene-
gade, China took 59. 1 percent of the Albanian total. 1 In 1961, China 
extended a loan of $123 million to Albania and promised to establish 
two textil e factories. 2 
Bulgaria. Sino-Bulgarian trade opened in 1952, and by 1958 
Bulgarian exports reached 41 million rubles (calculated tourist ex-
change rate of 28 rubles to a pound). 3 Besides agricultural machines 
and small e lectr ic motors , which form one-third of all Bulgarian 
exports to China, she also exports non- ferrous metals, chemicals, 
fertili zers , plants and power stations , dr illing equipment , behicles 
and so on, fo r Chinese tin, tire s, leather , jute , and such . 4 
East Germany. China and East Germany have one thing in 
common that stand out quite distinctly - struggle for recognition 
by the other na tions of the world. East Germany is the most im-
portant trade partner of China, nex t only is the Soviet Russia , and 
closely followed by Czechoslovakia. East Ge rmany supplied China 
l Tt·e tiak, " China's European Ally" , p. 37 1. 
2szczpanik , op . cit. , p . 112. 
3Liliana Brisby , "Bulgaria: Leaping Forward Without Communes", 
The China QLtarterly, No. 3 (July-September, 1963) , 82. 
4s zczepanik , op. cil. , p. 114. 
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Table 14 . China's trade with Soviet bloc , 1958-1963 (U. S. $million) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
BULGARIA 
Imports from 11.3 6.3 
Exports to 7.2 10.0 
CZECHOSLOV 
Imports to 109 .2 99 . 6 12 9 
Exports to 91. 0 95.5 26 29 
EAST GERMANY 
Imports 89 50 20 
Exports 90 36 29 
HUNGARY 
Imports to 57.6 39.6 
Exports to 33.5 44.3 
POLAND 
Imports to 72.2 42.9 50 27 15 19 
Exports to 36.3 56. 1 46 21 23 25 
RUMANIA 
Imports 25.9 29 .4 33 9 2 14 
Exports 16 . 6 29.9 26 20 11 10 
Note: Roughly converted at the following rate , Polish Zloty 100 = rubbes 
22. 5; E. Ge r ma: Mark 100 = rubbes 40. 50; Rumanian lei 100 = rubbes 
15; Ruble 1 = U. S. $1. l. 
Sourc 1 58-1959 figu res, Colina MacDougall, "China: East E uropean 
Trade," Far Eastern Economi c Revie w, LI(January 27, 1966) , 
P• 123. 
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with complete sets of equipment for 32 power stations, two cement 
plants , and set of turbines in 1958-1959. The value of East German 
exports being almost doubled that of all the other Soviet satellites put 
together . China has incurring deficits on her East German trade until 
1962. 1 About 90 percent of Chinese imports from East Germany con-
sisted of capital goods , while China exported rice, vegetable oil, and 
raw materials . 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia exported 
rail way equipment, machines , metallurgical products, trucks, chemicals , 
cables, power stations, radio transmitters , machine tools, tractors, 
and diesel engines, while China exported food stuffs and tea, oi l seeds, 
non-ferrous metals , leather, tobacco, soybe ans, and other agri-
cultural products . 
During the period 1953-1957 there was a marked increase in 
dealings with the Communist countries. The increase was reported 
to be from 72 percent in 1953, and to 80 percent in 1954-1956, in terms 
of value of goods . 2 In terms of volume of goods, it had already reached 
the 80 percent level by 1952. 3 Chinese press reports stated that China's 
1Martin J. Esslin , "East Ger:na ny: Peking- Pankow Axis?" , 
The Chino. Quarterly , No. 3 (July-Septemb~r. 1960) , 86 . 
2
.Far Eastern E conomi c Revie~, XXi (December 13 , 1956) , 752. 
3Ibid. , p. 109. 
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trade wi th the Communist countries in 1958 was expected to increase 
by 10 percent above the 1957 level , which would make this trade 
about $2 , 000 million, as compared with $1,820 million of the 1957 
level of trade . 1 
China's East European trade figures were not made available 
until 1960 , but in 1961 some figures have been declared by the partner 
countries . 
The total trade of China with the Communist countries i.n 1960 
was $2 ,2 38 million and this dropped to $1,184 million in 1961. Trade 
with the non-Communist nations was worth $1,437 in 1960 , which receded 
to $1,381 million in 1961. 2 This shows that China's trade with the 
Communist counh·ies has fallen more drastically than with the Free 
World. 
Among the East European countries, her trade with Czecho-
slovakia fell by 67 percent and her exports to that country by 55 per-
cent. Her imports from Poland fell by 26 pe rcent and exports by 55 
percent. 3 
1Ibid.' p . 109. 
2colina MacDouga ll , "China: East Euvopean Trade," Far 
Eastern Economic Review, XXXIX (March 14, 1963), 542. 
3Ibid. 
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From the accompanying statistics on the Sino-East European 
trade, one can observe tha t the trade between these countries flourished 
until the turn of the decade of 1950's. By the last few months of 1959, 
there was a sign of decline, which culminated into a big drop in 1960. 
This fall in trade with the European "fraternal! countries is 
directly related to her conflict with the U. S.S.R. , the withdrawal of 
Soviet aid, and Chinese efforts to build up an export surplus in order 
to accelerate the repayment of the previous Soviet aid . These 
factors were accompanied by the internal economic crisis owing 
to failure of the Great Leap . Again , Chinese goods wer e facing 
an inelastic demand in these countries . The agricultural calamities 
within China forced her to buy huge amounts of foodstuff from the West. 
As a result , her total trade declined and her industrial advance s lowed 
down. 
Trade With the Non-Communist World 
The importance of the trade with non-Communist countries to 
the economy of China was comparatively little before 1960. With the 
decline i.1 Sino-Bloc trade, there was a phenomenal rise in the Sino-
Free World trade. Thus, in thi s discuss:on Sino-Bloc trade relations 
have been dealt with at length. 
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Communist China ' s first post-Korean contact with the Western 
trading interes ts took place a t the Moscow inte rnational economic 
confere nce of Apr il 1952. F r om then onwards, Sino-Western trade 
gradually rose . Chinese trade with the CONCOM countries is subject 
to government control and all exports must be licensed, and imports of 
Chinese manufactures are subject to quota . 
Western Europe and Japan 
P r ior to 1960 , We stern European trade was much smaller, for 
Russia was the main source of supply of the industrial goods which went 
to China. Aft.er 1955, West Eur ope supplied a little over 10 percent of 
imports of China, and absorbed about 8 to 9 percent of Chinese exports. 
Even in the peak year of the Chinese trade (1958) West Europe supplied 
only about one- fifth of total Chinese imports. 1 
The e mbargo was very important until 1957·. In 1959, it was 
relaxe · and ,ere was a sharp rise in China's imports from the West. 
This indicaies that Soviet bloc 's supplies were inadequate. Again she 
had broken up trade r e lations with Japan, and had entered into the Great 
Leap with the background of good harvests that year. There was a great 
demand for iron and stee l , fe rtili zer , rolled copper, and nickle. 
l 
L2\v i1:, o r . ci t . , p ._52. 
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Until 1962, China had not bought very substantial quantities 
of Western machinery, though it bought consistently - in particular, 
from Britain and West Germany. Its main imports from England have 
been wool , iron a nd steel, non-ferrous metals , and chemicals. Im-
ports from France, have been iron and steel and fertilizers, and in 
recent years, cereals . Imports from Germany have been iron and 
steel and chemicals . At the end of 1963, two fertilizer factories were 
ordered - one from Netherlands and the other from the United Kingdom. 
Italy supplies a petroleum refinery, and an alcohol plant from France . 1 
China's trade Minister Lu Hsu-Chang, on his visit to Europe, indicated 
his interest in buying more of agricultural machinery , precision in-
struments, tractors, mining equipments, trucks, and air crafts . 2 
Chinese exports to the industrial West have been mainly eggs, 
tung oil , oil seeds , hides, tea, silk, wool, edible oils , cotton , and such 
raw materials and agr icultural products. The United Kingdom and West 
Germany have been the most important buyers (see Table 
J apan is another source of industrial goods for China. China 
exchanged foodstuffs , coal, iron ore , salt and soybeans for J apanes e 
1Lewin, op. ci t. , p. 57. 
2v. Wolpert , "Minister Lu in London", Far Eas~.!!_~conomic 
Review, XL (May 9, 1963), 313-317. 
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synthetic fibers, machine tools, steel, and chemicals . The total 
trade turnover in 1950 touched $60 million, but was reduced to $15 
million in 1952, because of the embargo. 1 Then onwards Sino-
Japanese trade expanded but gradually. In 1956, Chinese imports reached 
its highest at U. S. $67. 3 million, while Chinese exports touched 83. 6 
million. By 1958, when a Japanese worker tore off a Chinese flag, 
they receded to $50. 6 million and $54. 4 million and in 1959 they reached 
almost a vanishing point of $3 .6 million Chinese imports and 18. 9 
million exports. Sino-Jananese trade, with a raphoachment, again re-
vived in 1962. to $38. 5 million Chinese imports and $46 million Chinese 
exports to Japan. 2 In the future Japan is expected to replace Russia 
for Chinese industrial necessities. In 1963 , medium and long term 
credit arrangements for China were worked out by Japan. 
Canadian and Australian Grains 
China has been buying small quantities of wheat from Canada 
and Australia prior to the agricultural calamities of 1959, 1960, and 
1961. In these years China bought grains from Australia worth $162 
1Lewin, op. cit. , p. 58. 
2Dick Wilson , "Trade Across the China Sea" , Far Eastern 
Economic Review, XLV (Septe mber 3, 1964) , 429. 
133 
Table 15. Chinese imports, main trading partners and type of commodity, 
(U.S. $ million) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 
(Grain Exporters) 
Australia 24 162 97 202 
Argentina 4 20 3 
Canada 9 121 137 _J!1_ 
Total 34 287 260 302 
West Europe (Indus trial Export) 
43a 58 a France 53 36 
Belgium 44 10 8 10 
Italy 40 30 19 19 
Netherlands 4 3 13 
Sweden 13 8 5 5 
Switzerland 8 6 4 4 
United Kingdom 90 37 24 37 
West Germany ~ _B _B 15 
Total 350 162 137 161 
Japan (Mainly industrial) 3 17 38 62 
Industrial total 353 179 175 223 
Asian and African (raw materials, 
mainly rice, rubber, cotton, etc. ) 
Burma 7 37 14 
Ceylon 25 17 28 21 
Indonesia 35 36 20 34 
Malaya and Singapore 28 4 0 5 
Syria 12 4 20 
Pakistan 14 10 2 13 
Tanzania 10 
Sweden 9 4 9 12 
Uganda 5 9 11 
Raw material total 123 129 64 140 
GRAND TOTAL 510 595 499 665 
Total including countries not 
listed here 687 741 587 723 
alncludes cereals in the following value: 1964~$29 million ; 1963 ~ $44 
million ; 1962 ~ $29 million. 
Source: Colina MacDougall , "China's Foreign Trade," Far Eastern 
~conomic_Beview, LI(January 27, 1966), p. 122. 
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million in 1961, $97 million in 1962, and $202 million in 1963. Grain 
purchases from Canada amounted to $121 million in 1961, $137 million 
in 1962 , and $97 million in 1963. France supplied cereals worth $29 
million in 1962 and $44 million in 1963. Argentina and Mexico also 
sold small quantities of grains. As a result, China had to spend 
(including 15 percent of freight charges) , $376 million in 1961, $332 
million in 1962, and $398 million in 1963 on grain imports. 1 This 
diverted a huge amount of her scarce foreign exchange away from 
industrial imports. 
E ven during these days of scarcity of goods in China, she has 
been continuing to export rice, for rice commands a higher price than 
wheat . 2 She has tried to shift local consumption of rice to wheat through 
rationing. 
Latin American, African, and Asian Trade 
China is motivated to trade with these countries on political 
grounds, because economically these countries are not complementary. 
The gain through comparative advantage is rot significant enough. The 
1colina MacDougall , "China's Foreign Trade" , Far Eastern 
Economic Review, LI (January 27, 1966) , 122. 
2 
Lewin , op. cit. , p. 68 . 
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trading partners, on the whole, are agricultural and labor intensive. 
Again, these countries are also trying to industrialize themselves and 
so, they need industrial equipme nt which China cannot supply for she 
is herself not yet an industrial country . Her cost of production of 
industrial goods is high compared with the industrially advanced nations. 
As a consequence, the demand for China's goods is limited, and the 
prospect for the economies of scale to operate in Chinese industrial 
production are dim. As seen earlier, the quality of goods produced in 
China has been too poor to compete with Western goods. Moreover, 
China's economy is not strong enough to enable her to extend credits 
on a large-scale to enable these developing nations to buy her goods. 
On the contrary , China would like to build up a surplus with all her 
trading partners, which these developing countries would not welcome. 
The agricultural goods that China buys from these countries are, in 
most cases, available from other sources more cheaply. Thus, the 
trade with these countries is probably a design for exporting Marxism, 
but these chances are rather remote. 1 
Before 1956, no African state recognized Communist China, 
but today fourteen states have done so. Of these, China's big trading 
~obert A. Scalapino , "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa". 
Foreign Affairs , XXXXli (.July, 1964), 653. 
136 
partners are the United Arab Republic, Morocco, Mali (including 
Senegal and Mauritania) , Nigeria, and Ghana, in order of importance. 
In general , there is a declining tendency in her trade with these countries 
since 1960. TI1ey are also feeling the heat of the Sino-Soviet conflict. 
China has created a surplus with nearly every country except for small 
deficits with Kenya, Syria, and Morocco. 1 
China bought Egyptian cotton, textiles, and peanuts from the 
UAR. Other cotton supplying countries are Sudan, Tanganyika, and 
Uganda. In general , Chinese imports from African countries are oil 
seeds , cereals , gum, skins, minerals, sugar, cotton, tobacco, coffee, 
industrial diamonds, and Algerian oil. Chinese exports consisted of 
light machinery, steel , textile machinery, sugar refining equipment , 
tea, pig iron, chemicals, paper, and dyes. 
On her trade with Latin America, China imports Brazilian cloth, 
wood, and tobacco; Cuban sugar, and nickel, copper manganese, tobacco, 
and hides. China exports paper and chemicals to Brazil; to Cuba she 
sends rice, rolled steel, machinery, chemicals, cotton cloth, and tinned 
meat . Most of the other Latin American countries, such as Argentina, 
1Figures for 1960 and 1961 are taken from; 1963 Year Book 
of the Far Eastern Economic Review (HongKing: Far Eastern Review, 
1964) , p. 86. 
Figures for 1962 are taken from ; Daniel Wofstone, "Sino-African 
Economics" , Far Eastern Economic Review, XXXXIII (January 13, 
1964)' 349 . 
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Uruguay, and Chile, want China to pay in hard currency and their 
tariff wall s are too high for Chinese goods. They would not allow 
China to build up a surplus in their trade, which has discouraged 
China in developing her South American trade. 1 
Afro-Chinese annual trade has surpassed the $100 million 
level only once (1960) in the last ten years , while in South America 
it has seldom touched $10 million until she made Cuban sugar pur-
chases in 1961 and Argentinian grains in 1962. 2 
With her Asian neighbors her motives behind trade are guided 
by politico-economic considerations. Burmese rice, Ceylon's rubber, 
and Indonesian oil are given preferred treatments and long-term con-
tracts. She has expanded her trade with HongKong, Malaya, Indonesia, 
and Japan, since her first plan, so as to earn convertible exchange, 
cultivate politico-economic ties , and gauge the possibilities of getting 
long- term credits. China may dump her goods on the Asian market 
to compete with Japan and India in the future, so as to force her bargaining 
position there. 3 She has been exporting food products to the Chinese 
1Lewin, op. cit., p. 72-74. 
2Ibid., p. 72. 
3Yuan- Li Wu , The Economy of Communist China: An Intro-
duction , p. 180. 
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Table 16. Chinese exports, main trading partners and type of commodity 
(U. S. $ million) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 
ASIA 
(Light industrial prod. and food) 
Burma 25 21 27 26 
Ceylon 28 7 9 29 
Hong Kong 208 180 212 260 
Indonesia 52 35(10) 31a 
Malaya and Singapore 57 56 66 94 
Syria 1 4 3 
Pakistan 4 4 4 6 
(Mainly light industrial products) 
Australia 11 7 11 15 
Canada 6 3 4 5 
WEST EUROPE 
(Mainly raw materials and agricultural products) 
France 23 16 17 21 
Belgium 4 3 5 8 
Italy 24 12 14 19 
Netherlands 21 15 14 16 
Sweden 6 4 5 8 
Switzerland 9 9 10 10 
United Kingdom 70 86 65 52 
West Germany 69 40 ...1Q _..!! 
Total 169 175 
JAPAN 
(Mainly raw materials and agricultural products) 
Japan 21 31 46 .-1§. 
Total 215 250 
GRAND TOTAL 552 719 
Total including countr ies not listed here 745 641 666 825 
aJanuary-July, estimated (numbers in brackets denote number of months 
covered). 
Source: Colina MacDougall , "China's Foreign Trade," Far Eastern Review, 
LI(January 27, 1966) , p. 121. 
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inhabitants of HongKong and Malaya, and agricultural raw materials 
and light industrial goods to the rest of her co-traders. 
Composition and Direction of Trade 
In the pre-Communist era in 1947, consumer goods con-
sisted of 19 percent, capital goods 18 percent, and the other 62 percent 
raw materials (such as cotton) and fuel (gasoline). 1 But soon after the 
Communist takover, the composition of imports changed. Capital goods 
comprised 31 percent, consumer goods less than 9 percent, raw materials 
and fuel about 61 percent. For the period 1955-1957 imports from the 
Soviet consisted of machinery and e.quipment 37 . 2 percent, and from the 
West 7. 6 percent; transportation equivment from Russia accounted for 
2. 5 percent and from the West 1. 9 percent; crude chemicals, 1. 7 per-
cent from the "Iron Curtain" and 24.4 percent from the "Free countries!' ;' 
while Russia supplied 19. 8 percent of manufactures and the West supplied 
22. 9 percent of it; and other requirements amounted to 36. 7 percent from 
the Soviets and 8. 6 percent from the West. 2 There was only a very small 
portion of "other" things, consisting of consumer goods . 
1Yuan-Li Wu, An Economic S~rvey of Communist China (New 
York: Bookman Company, 1956) , p. 469. 
2Yuan- Li Wu , The Economy of Communist China: An Intro-
duction, p. 174. 
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China's exports have predominantly been metals, foodstuffs, 
agricultural raw materials , textiles, and light industrial goods. Dur-
ing the period 1952-1957 , for which the statistics are available, China 
has made huge surpluses by making net exports of food products to the 
tune of $5 . 8 billion in 1952 , $7.6 billion in 1953 , $5.55 billion for 1954, 
about $7 billion in 1955 , $7 . 5 billion in 1956 , and $6. 6 billion in 1957 . 1 
Thus, she is to a very great extent dependent on agriculture for her 
imports. 
As regards direction of trade, the Communist bloc took 26 
percent of her trade in 1950, according to Soviet statistics (Chinese 
version, 33.5 percent). By the end of the Firs t Plan it rose to 75 per-
cent (about 50 percent with the Soviet Union) . 2 This shows that the 
political affiliations, rather than economic considerations, have played 
a very important role in Chinese international trade relations. But there 
was a sudden change in the direction of trade by 1960. In 1960, the non-
bloc trade was 42 . 2 percent of the total trade of $3,475 million in 1961 
and 1962. It was 56 percent each of the total trade of $2,464 million 
1Based on figures given in Ta-Chung Liu and Kung-Chia 
Yeh, The Economy of the Chinese Mainland: National Income and 
Economic Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press , 1965) , p. 253 . 
2Ibid., p. 175 . 
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and $2, 198 million, respectively. 1 In 1963, there was a trend further 
away from the bloc .- non-bloc countries absorbing 64 percent of the 
tota l trade of $2,420 million . 2 TI1is i ndicates that China's total volume 
of trade had touched its bottom in 1962, after a consistent decline since 
1960. This tendency of rising non-bloc trade may be attributed to China's 
buying of grains from the West in her years of bad harvests. But the 
1962 figures give a definite indication towards the future rise in China's 
Western trade. 
From the above discussion one may come to the conclusion 
that China could implement her First Five Year Plan only because of 
Russian trade and assistance. The same is true of the Great Leap 
Forward. Internally the financing of this industrialization was made 
possible by cutting down the consu!p.tion to its minimum. If the same 
thing is looked at from the point of view of external economic relations 
it was financed by creating a trade surplus and giving high priority to 
industrial equipments and restricting the consumption of imports . It 
was only when she was faced with the Great Leap Forward disasters and 
the agricultural calamities that she had to buy huge amounts of grains 
1Based on figures given by, Colina MacDougall, "China' s 
Foreign Trade" , Far Eastern E conomic Review, LI (January 27, 
1966) , 122. 
2Ibid. 
r. I)Je 1'• . F ~.;... {. . .VQ(l r-ou". tr tcs ' trade wi th China , 195()··1963" 
______ Q!nnese 1EJ2 r ts _ Chinese expor ts Chine se 
--- - -
12. ~Uh<?.:.'!Y? •J2_ -~~ucoru _ Tog' free-world -~ £Qffi ___ "export'' 
y ,·ar \·a ,,e lnde:><. Value Index Value Index Value Index surplus 
- - - --------- --- - - -
1950 4 52 67. 5 53 5 69.7 + 82.6 
1&51 446 66.6 526 68.4 + 78.5 
1952 273 41 .4 368 48.0 + 95.4 
19G3 28 '1 !2 . 9 433 56.4 +145.3 
lf·54 294 13. 9 380 49. 5 + 85 .5 
1955 317 47.3 487 63.4 +16 . 8 
1956 434 64.9 204 58 . 6 641 83.7 225 85 . 3 +20 I. 2 
1957 528 78.9 210 60.4 624 81.4 204 77.4 + 9fi . 2 
1958 771 115.2 447 128.8 756 98.6 226 85.6 - 15. 1 
1959 652 97.4 336 96.8 693 90.4 226 85.5 + 41. 8 
1960 669 100. 0 347 100.0 767 100.0 264 100. 0 + 97.7 
1961 742 110.9 294 84.7 638 83. 1 223 84 . 5 -104. 7 
1S62 637 95.2 309 89 1 599 78. 1 215 81.6 - 38. 5 
1 63 654 97. 7 316 91. 0 754 98.4 245 93 . 0 +100.6 
aCuban trade was included in free-world statistics, Chinese imports from Cuba were, U. s. $32. 1 in 
1960, 95.6 in 1961 and 85. 3 in 1962. Chinese exports to Cuba are unknown. Index = (1960 = 100). 
Value = U. S. dollars (millions)-figures are rounded. 
Source: Based on tables given in, Yuan-Li Wu, The Economv of Communist China: An Introduction (New 
York: Frederick A, Praeger, 1965), pp. 183-184. 
from the West, worth more than $l. 5 btllion over the pe riod of 1961-
1964 . Th ts reduced her total trade and s lowed down her indus trial 
growth. 
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Po.,, quality Chinese goods is a nothe r big factor that inhibits 
her t rade. She must develop new products and improve the quality of 
her goods . Unless s he expands her exports , China will have to depend 
on for eign trade for her indus trial developme nt for a long time to come. 
Once she pays up her debts to Ru ssia, and ge ts over he r internal 
food proble m, she can expand he r trade in the futur e . But in any event , 
China 's r apid industr ialization program, in the absence of a huge in-
crease in exports, mus t depend on Western cooper a tion. 
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CHAP TER VII 
Ah APPRAISA L OF CHINA 'S INDUSTRIALIZATION 
National Income 
As the discus sion above has revealed , statistics of Chinese 
ec no mic deve lo ment have been highly unreliable. In any case , 
ir: ·;; ~ri l ~ig-..lnls are mor reliable than the others . The national 
According to the offi cial figure s , the net material product 
ine1 eased by 53 per cent in 1952- 1957 (1952 = 100). By 1959, it was 
150 pe~cent . As given in Table , Liu- Yeh 's e stimates give us an 
in ·ea se i "ne t darn stic pr oduct" between 1952 a nd 1957 as 33.4 
percent increase (1952 = 100) , with a 75 pe r cent increase in 1959 . 1 
On tt,., c •hu hand , Willi.::.m W. Holliste r shows an increase of 51 percent 
o rer tl.~ 19'' 2·- 1957 period and 122 percent over 1952-1959. 2 
1 Ta- Chung Li ~.; and Kung- Chia Yeh, ' 'Preliminary Es timates 
o: ~~e Natk,n2: :n~~:;nc ~f the Chine ..... 'I··· ~1la d, 1952-1959," American 
_E conomic Review Papers and P r oceedings , LI (May, 1961), 4 89. 
2William W. Hollister, China's Gross Na tional P roduct and 
Soc 'al ccounts , 1\:':' f·- •.>lf>l (Chicago : Th :F ree P ress of Glencoe, 
195d;' pp. 132- : 33. 
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Professor Wu shows an increase of about 33 percent between 
1952 and 195 7, followed by another increase of 20 percent between 1957 
and 1960, with a decline of 31 1erce mt om 1960-1961. 1 Thus, the 
rate of SlUlU<u growth over the 1952-195 7 period woudl be, according 
to o ffi cial hgures , 8. 9 percent, Liu- Yeh esti mate 6 percent, Hollister's 
8. 6 percent, and w,,•s 5. 2 percent. 
U we take the Liu-Yeh statistics on national income of China, 
we obser ve that over the F irst Five Year Plan agriculture had shown 
very little progress. During the good harvest years of 1958 and 1959 
agricd re r.oweci :"airly good performance . F actory manufacturing 
had shown a very impressive gain of nearly a four-fold increase over 
1952-195'1 . But the predominant share went to the producer's goods 
industries which increased s ix-fold over the same period, while consumer's 
goods was 4.uite low. But then it was about three times higher than 
producer' s goods . At the same time imports of comsumption goods 
was s ubflt(.OIO:ial. One~ the Communists took over , imports of con-
s•.;mptior goods was ver.Y Insignificant. As a result, with a rise in 
population r ise in the rat s of investment and taxation, and an 
1Fr orn ·uan- Li Wu, eta!. , Tne Economic Potential of Communist 
Chma (Menlo P ar k , Caiifornia: Stanfor d .Research Institute , 1963), pp. 
24 1 anrl 340 ; quoted in "\'uan- Li Wu , The F. conomy of Communist China: 
An Introduction (New Yo<"k: Frederick A. P raeger, 1965) , p. 88 . 
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accelera ion in the expor s (especially of the agricultural products) meant 
a severe squeeze on tile consumers and particularly those in the agri-
cultural sector. 
Tne snares of mining, cons truction, transporation, trade , 
and government administration were substantial. 
Population Growth and Consumption 
All through this study it has been observed that China's r apid 
population growth has been a formidable drag on her economic growth. 
Population gro wth has a very significant e ffe c · on labor- supply, per capita 
consumption, per capita output, composition of output , and volume of 
exports and imports . 
Ltke all other economic s tatistics of China , population figures 
are also dubious. According to a British writer, Russell Warren Howe, 
China's population may be as low as 400 million, or the same as that 
of India. l rne census taken by the Communist regime in 1953 showed a 
total oi 1> 8:> mil ion, which at the rate of 2 percent growth, should expand 
to '747 m1l1i n today. 11vt11er source suggests, during those disasterous 
1Russell Wa:::-r en Howe, "Chinese Checkers Check Again, " 
§jatis, September 3, 1965 , p. 62 1; quoted in Dick Wilson, "Counting 
the Heads , " F ar Eastern E conomic Review, L1 (January 6, 1966), 22. 
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Table 18 . National income of the C i~~>c Mainland , 1933 and 1952-1959a 
Billions of constant 1952 yuan 
Vallle a ded in 1933 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Agriculture 33 . 9 34 . 2 34. 8 35.5 35.8 37.0 
Manufacturing 
fac ories 3. 9 6 . 5 8. 3 9.6 10.4 14.5 
P roducer's goods 0. 8 3. 2 4 . 4 5.3 6.3 9.4 
Consumers goods 2. 5 3. 3 3. 9 4 . 3 4. 1 5. 1 
Handicraft 4. 4 4. 7 4. 8 5. 0 5. 1 5.3 
Mining 0. 5 1. 5 1. 5 1. 8 2. 3 2.4 
Utilities 0. 1 0. 3 0. 4 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Construction 1. 0 1. 8 2. 3 2 . 7 2. 9 5. 0 
Modern transpor -
tation an com-
- .... 
"' 0 
.a ~ .~ ~ ~ s t) g 
"2 ~ s '8 
0 Cl) 0 ~ 
u "'"tl 0. 
1957 1958 1959 
37 . 2 40 42 
16.0 19 25 
11. 1 14 19 
4. 9 5 6 
5 . 4 6 6 
3. 1 4 5 
0. 7 1 1 
4 . 6 6 8 
municati"ons · 1..1 2. 1 2 . 6 2. 9 3 . 1 3. 5 3 . 8 4 5 
Old fashioned 
trans portation 2. 6 
Trade 8. 2 
;overnment 
a m mistra ion 1. 4 
F inance 0. 4 
Personal ,:j 1-~ 1·v u..:es 0. 6 
Res idential rents . 2. 0 
Work brigacles 
2. 7 2. 5 2.4 2.3 2. 5 2.4 3 
9.7 10. 0 10.2 10.5 11. 2 11.5 12 
3.3 
1.3 
0. 6 
2.3 
0. 6 
3.7 
1.3 
0.6 
2. 3 
0.4 
4.0 
1.5 
0. 5 
2. 4 
0.4 
4. 1 
1.5 
0.5 
2.4 
0.8 
4.8 
1. 7 
0. 5 
2. 5 
0. 8 
5. 0 
1. 8 
0.5 
2.6 
0. 9 
5 
2 
3 
3 
3 
14 
6 
2 
1 
3 
3 
Net ~mestic 
Product 59.5 71. 4 75 . 3 79 . 3 82 . 3 92. 1 95.3 108 125 
..;om. Chinese 
es i mate of 
National 
incon1~ 61 . 1 70. 0 73.9 78 . 8 88 . 8 93.5 125.3 152. 4 
a bSub1tem are rm,nded figures. 
Official exchange rate: U. S. $1 = 2, 34 :i 1952 Yuan (The "J enming Pi" ) Note : 
fo r wellknown reasons, the figures should not be c onverted into U. S. $. 
Source : Ta- Chung L iu and Kung-Chia Yeh, "Preliminary Es timate of the 
National Income o the Chinese Mainland, 1952-1959 , " The Ame r ic an 
EconomiC Review Papers a nd P roceedings, LI(May , 1961) , p . 490. 
vears of 1960 to 1962 , some 50 million people died of hunger and 
deficiency diseases. 1 In a ny case, various other estimates of total 
population fail between 700 to 725 million figure for 1966 ; and the 
estimated rate of growth falls between 2 percent to 2 1/4 percent. 2 
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F t·om the above table it is quite evident that the gross domestic 
product has been consistently rising from 1952 down to 1960, in absolute 
terms; and so has the gross domestic investment. The ratio of gross 
domestic product to gross domestic investment has also been success-
ively rising until the last months of 1960. In 1952 it was 19 . 1 per-
cent ; in 19G7 . 25. 8 percent; in the second year of the Great Leap 
(1959) it reached 33 .8. percent. It touched its highest watermark 
in 196 0, at the 43. 7 percent leve l , and r eceded in its last months. 
In 1961 it reached its bottom at 2 1. 4 ; and again picked up in 1962, 
reaching 32. 8 percent level. 
On the other hand , government consumption has been more or 
less around 10 percent of the gross domestic product. 
As a result a larger bulk of the rising gross domestic product 
has been diverted away from consumption as the years passed by. 
1
"General Survey". Chin3o ]'<~ws Analysis , No. 432 (August 10 , 
l:io41, b. 
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At the same time, the population has been growing at an average rate of 
about 2. 2 percent between 1949 and 1958. Thus, per capita personal 
consumption has been squeezed throughout the period under study. 
A minimum subsistence level has been estimated at 168 yuan 
per capita for the urban population and 79. 6 yuan for the rural population , 
or a mean of 92. 6 yuan for the population in general. 1 The above table 
reveals that during this period, only during the period 1956-1959 has 
this subsistence level been met. In the year 1960 and 1961 the consump-
tion level has fallen much below the bare subsistence level. 
Th 1;easants spent 58 percent of their income on food in 1955 , 
15 percent on clothing , 22 percent on consumer goods, and 5 percent 
on services, while urban workers spent 55 percent on food , 12 percent 
on clothing , 13 percent on consumers goods , and 20 percent on services, 
ren•. utihties, and transportation. 2 These figures represent the 
characteristics of a typically underdeveloped society that the Chinese 
e Jcnc my possesses. 
s a consequence the r apid economic growth in Communist 
Clnna has not really benefited the consumers; r ather industrialization has 
taken place at the cost of consumers. 
1Yuan-Li Wu, op. cit., p. 90. 
2Ibid . . n. 91. 
T able 19. Estimate of Chiua's gr oss domesti c product, investment and consumption, 1952-1962 
Gr oss Gross Per capita 
domes tic dom-s tic Government Mid-year personal 
produc t inves tment .consumptioll_ e sidual population consumption 
(19G2 B. Y. )a a (195J B. Y. {' (i n million) ( in yuan) (l9G~ B. Y.) \ 1952 B. Y. ) 
1952 75. 6 14.5 7.3 53.8 568 . 9 94 . 6 
1953 78.9 19. 0 9. 1 50.8 582.6 87.2 
1954 82.2 20.6 8.0 53.6 594.8 90. 1 
1955 86.1 22 . 1 8. 4 55.6 608. 2 91.4 
1956 96.6 25.3 8 . 5 62.8 612.2 101. 1 
1957 100.0 25.8 10.3 63.9 637.2 100. 3 
1958 110.7 29. 9 10.6 70.2 654.0 107.3 
1959 119. 1 40 .3 11. 0 67.8 668.0 101. 5 
1960 120.7 52 . 8 13.1 54.8 682.0 80.4 
1961 82. l 17.6 11. 2 53.3 693 .0 76.9 
1962a 109 . 0 35.8 11.4 61. 8 705. 0 87 . 7 
:(1952 B. Y.) = In billions of 1952 yuan. 
R evised estimates. 
Source: Quoted in Yuan-Li Wu, The Economy of Communist China: An Introduction (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1965) , p. 91. 
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According to Professor Wu, the rate of growth of the gross 
national product in Communist China is 6 percent a year, if the 1952 -
1962 period is considered. On a per capita basis, the annual growth rate 
of gross national product would be 3. 6 percent for 1952-1960, and for 
1952-1962 it would be 1. 5 percent. If economic development means a 
rise in per capita personal consumption, the annual growth rate of . 25 
percent total during 1952-1960 period, and per capita consumption -2. 5 
percent. During the period of 1952-1962 it would be 1. 4 percent. total 
and - 0. 75 percent per capita. 1 
Future Prospects 
In a predominantly agricultural country like China, it is on 
the performance of the agricu ltural sector, which feeds the rapidly 
rising urban and the rural population and e nables a 'high rate of investment 
without which industrialization would be slowed down and the squeeze on 
the consumers would be too hard to borne by them. The wageries of the 
weathe r is another factor that poses an obstacle in the path of a rapid 
e conomic growth .in China. She must provide herself with better farm 
equipment , increase the production of fertilizers . They must also take 
s pecial measures to conserve and reclaim the land, so as to increase 
the acreage under cultivation . 
1Yuan-Li Wu, p. 203. 
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The high priority given to undustrialization was changed in favor 
of "agriculture being the foundation and industry the leading factor" of 
economic development , in those hard years of 1960-1962 . Most observers 
of the Chinese affairs feel that this shift in e mphais was temporary . 
Certainly , the Chinese Communists would not be able to afford another 
Great Leap disaster. Chinese peasants do have a certain freedom re-
garding thier private plots and in marketing of produce not subject to 
s tate procurement. But it is not certain as to how long this freedom 
will last , for in the interest of national defence and rapid industrialization , 
the consut ters may have to suffer even more. China has made dis-
asterous blunders in isolating herself from the rest of the world and 
especially from the Sovie t bloc , so that she is unable to obtain credits 
from other countries, which has put extra pressure on the consumers. 
This was only possible because it is a totalitarian regime. 
China's steel output of 15 kilos per capita , is only one- thirtieth 
o Brit· h production and one-fifth of American. A minimum annual 
supply of . 5 tons of coal energy per capita is essential to create con-
ditions of an industrialized community. China, a t present, has only 3 
percen of this amount of energy. While the United States has eight tons 
of coal e nergy per capita. 1 Thus, China has to go a long way to r ank 
1w. K. , " China 's 'Third Five Year Plan", The China Quarter ly, 
No. 25 (January-March, 1966) , 174 . 
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among the industrial nati ons of the world . Her future economic develop-
ment would depend on he r abi lity to increase the productivity of her 
agricultur a l sector and controlling population growth . China should also 
pay particular a ttention to having a coordinated and a consistent planning 
mechanism. 
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